Rethinking Measurement of Pay Disparity and its Relation to Firm Performance by Rouen, Ethan Casey
Rethinking Measurement of Pay Disparity
and its Relation to Firm Performance
The Harvard community has made this
article openly available.  Please share  how
this access benefits you. Your story matters
Citation Rouen, Ethan. "Rethinking Measurement of Pay Disparity and its
Relation to Firm Performance." Harvard Business School Working
Paper, No. 18-007, July 2017.
Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33468916
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://
nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP
 Rethinking Measurement of Pay 
Disparity and its Relation to Firm 
Performance   
Ethan Rouen    
Working Paper 18-007 
  
Working Paper 18-007 
 
 
Copyright © 2017 by Ethan Rouen 
Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and discussion only. It may 
not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working papers are available from the author. 
 
 
 
Rethinking Measurement of Pay 
Disparity and its Relation to Firm 
Performance  
  
Ethan Rouen 
Harvard Business School 
 
 
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rethinking Measurement of Pay Disparity and its Relation to Firm Performance* 
 
 
 
 
Ethan Rouen 
Harvard Business School 
erouen@hbs.edu 
 
July 2017 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Disclaimer: This research was conducted with restricted access to Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data. The views 
expressed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the BLS or the U.S. Government. 
 
I am grateful for the support of my dissertation committee, Dan Amiram, Fabrizio Ferri (co-chair), Trevor Harris (co-
chair), Shiva Rajgopal, and Nachum Sicherman. Bureau of Labor Statistics employees Jessica Helfand, Michael 
LoBue, and Michael Soloy provided vital assistance with data. I benefited from the comments of Rob Brown, 
Elizabeth Handwerker, Mark Lowenstein, Ric Wise and workshop participants at Baruch College, Boston College, 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics Office of Employment and Unemployment Statistics, Columbia Business School, 
Emory University, Georgetown University, Harvard Business School, Indiana University, the Ohio State University, 
Rochester University, Stanford University, the University of California-Los Angeles, the University of Colorado, the 
University of Illinois-Chicago, the University of Michigan, the University of Minnesota, the University of North 
Carolina, and Yale School of Management. I also am thankful for financial support from the Deloitte Foundation, the 
W. Edwards Deming Center, the Institute of Management Accountants Research Foundation, and the Paul and Sandra 
Montrone Doctoral Fellowship. 
	
 
 
Rethinking Measurement of Pay Disparity and its Relation to Firm Performance 
 
Abstract 
I develop measures of firm-level pay disparity and examine their relation to firm accounting 
performance. Using comprehensive compensation data for a large sample of firms, I find no 
statistically significant relation between the ratio of CEO-to-mean employee compensation and 
performance. I next create empirical models that allow me to separate the components of CEO and 
employee compensation explained by economic factors from those that are not, and use these 
models to estimate explained and unexplained pay disparity. After validating my estimate of 
unexplained pay disparity as a proxy for pay fairness, I find robust evidence of a negative (positive) 
relation between unexplained (explained) pay disparity and future firm performance. Additional 
tests show that the negative relation between unexplained disparity and firm performance is driven 
by firms where both the CEO is overpaid and employees are underpaid, and is more pronounced 
for firms with weak corporate governance and high employee turnover.  
 
 
Keywords: disclosure; CEO pay ratio; pay disparity; corporate culture; compensation 
 
JEL Classifications:  G32, G35, J31, M12, M14, M52,
1 
 
Rethinking Measurement of Pay Disparity and its Relation to Firm Performance 
 
1. Introduction 
 In this paper, I develop measures of firm-level pay disparity, focusing on the ratio of CEO 
pay to average employee pay, and investigate how these measures relate to subsequent firm 
performance. The motivation for this examination is twofold. First, evidence of growing income 
inequality has led to greater interest in understanding firm-level pay disparity (viewed as a 
manifestation of, or, as some allege, a cause of income inequality) and its effect on firm 
performance. So far, the extensive literature on the relation between pay disparity and firm 
performance has yielded mixed results, even in near-identical settings (Gupta, Conroy, and Delery 
2012).1 Studies documenting a positive relation often interpret it as consistent with the predictions 
of Tournament Theory, which posits that greater pay disparity increases the value of a promotion, 
leading to increased effort and better results (Lazear and Rosen 1981). Studies documenting a 
negative relation frequently present it as evidence in support of Equity Theory: Pay disparity will 
cause resentment among lower-level employees, leading them to take actions, such as shirking or 
quitting, that are detrimental to firm performance (Akerlof and Yellen 1990). 
I argue that a potential reason for the inconsistent results is that many studies do not take 
into account how CEO and employee compensation are determined and therefore ignore the 
reasons for pay disparity. In interpreting pay disparity, researchers risk conflating income 
inequality — the difference in compensation between groups — and income inequity, or the notion 
that these differences are unfair or perceived as such (Trevor, Reilly, and Gerhart 2012). 
Compensation based on measurable attributes related to factors such as performance and labor 
																																								 																				
1 For example, corporate pay disparity among managers and executives has been shown to be both positively (Main, 
O’Reilly, and Wade 1993; Lee, Lev, and Yeo 2008; Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran 2009) and negatively (Bebchuk, 
Cremers, and Peyer 2011) related to accounting performance and firm value. 
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market characteristics creates pay disparity but may motivate employees to perform better — as 
suggested by Tournament Theory — without necessarily creating a perception of income inequity. 
This is because, presumably, compensation decisions would be viewed as fair reflections of skill 
and effort. In contrast, pay disparity created by factors unrelated to economics, such as the unfair 
distribution of rents or favoritism, may create feelings of resentment, leading to actions that are 
detrimental to the firm, consistent with Equity Theory. To the extent that unadjusted pay disparity 
reflects both economic and non-economic factors, it becomes difficult to interpret any relation 
between disparity and performance, and to test the underlying theories. As detailed below, in this 
study I attempt to empirically separate the portion of disparity reflecting economic factors and the 
portion due to unidentified factors, and examine their differing effects on firm performance. 
The second motivation for my examination of pay disparity is the recent adoption of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) rule mandating disclosure of the ratio of the CEO’s 
compensation to median employee pay starting in 2018. The SEC has stated that comparability of 
CEO pay ratios is hampered by the discretion given to firms in identifying the median employee 
(e.g., how to treat foreign workers) (SEC 2015). I argue that a more fundamental problem is that 
CEO pay ratios are not directly comparable, even within the same industry, unless they are 
properly adjusted to reflect the economic determinants of both the numerator, CEO pay, and the 
denominator, employee pay. While there is an extensive literature on the determinants of CEO 
pay, less is known about the determinants of employee pay. As shown in this study, there is 
significant variation in the “denominator” of these ratios and such variation reflects important 
economic factors. For example, Apple is likely to have a pay ratio that is much higher than any 
other firm in its industry because of its many retail stores, a factor that lowers its average employee 
pay due to a higher fraction of retail employees (who command lower pay in the labor market) 
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relative to better-paid engineers. Thus, for the SEC disclosure to be informative, it is important to 
separate economic and non-economic factors giving rise to differences in CEO pay ratios.2 
One significant challenge to attempting this parsing of compensation is the unavailability 
of data related to non-executive compensation and workforce composition. To overcome this 
challenge and examine the relation between (different sources of) pay disparity and firm 
performance, I obtain detailed confidential establishment-level annual data provided by the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for a large sample of firms in the S&P 1,500 from 2006 to 2013. 
These data include both total employee compensation and a series of establishment-level variables 
related to a firm’s operating environment and potentially affecting employee pay (e.g., the 
composition of the workforce).3 I aggregate the employee compensation data to estimate mean 
employee pay at the firm level and compute the ratio of CEO compensation to mean employee 
compensation (the Simple Pay Ratio, or SPR, going forward). Using these BLS data, I next 
construct an empirical model predicting the level of mean employee pay (for a given 
establishment) as a function of establishment, local macroeconomic, and firm variables. This 
model explains 61% of establishment-level mean employee pay. I aggregate the predicted 
employee pay across all establishments at a given firm to estimate the explained portion of 
employee pay at the firm-level.4 Similarly, following prior studies on executive pay, I estimate 
CEO compensation as a function of firm, CEO, and industry characteristics to obtain the explained 
portion of CEO pay (the model explains 56% of CEO pay). I define the ratio of explained CEO 
																																								 																				
2 It is not entirely clear whether the new pay ratio disclosure is supposed to provide better information about CEO 
pay by providing a relative benchmark via median employee pay to help investors identify “excessive” CEO pay, or 
about firm-level pay disparity and thus pay fairness (Menendez 2011; SEC 2013). The adjustments to pay disparity 
proposed in this study are relevant in either case. 
3 BLS compensation data are measured at the establishment level. An establishment is a single physical business 
location. For example, each Starbucks store is an establishment, as is Starbucks headquarters. 
4 Consistent with the labor economics literature, I use the term “explained” to describe the component of 
compensation that is predicted by regression models.  
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pay to explained employee pay as the Economic Pay Ratio, or EPR (i.e., the pay ratio that we 
would expect to observe based on the economic factors affecting CEO pay and those affecting 
employee pay). Finally, I subtract my estimate of the Economic Pay Ratio from the Simple Pay 
Ratio to obtain the Unexplained Pay Ratio, or UPR, a proxy for the portion of pay disparity not 
driven by economic factors. I find that this measure of unexplained pay disparity is negatively 
related to the likelihood of being named one of Fortune’s “100 Best Places to Work,” as well as 
to a proxy for employee turnover and a measure of pay fairness developed by JUST Capital (a 
non-profit organization that rates companies on various aspects of their social impact), providing 
support for the notion that my estimate does capture, at least to some extent, the construct of 
interest. 
I then examine how these measures of pay disparity relate to future firm performance, 
measured as year-ahead industry-adjusted return on net operating assets (Adj RNOA). In 
multivariate analyses I find no association between the Simple Pay Ratio (the unadjusted CEO pay 
ratio) and subsequent firm performance. However, pay ratios based on explained and unexplained 
compensation tell a different story. The Unexplained Pay Ratio exhibits a negative association 
with subsequent firm performance, suggesting, consistent with Equity Theory, that unjustified pay 
disparity (i.e., the portion unrelated to economic factors) can have detrimental effects on firm 
performance. In contrast, consistent with Tournament Theory, I find a strong positive relation 
between the Economic Pay Ratio and firm performance.  
The pay disparity-performance relations are economically significant: A one standard 
deviation increase in the unlogged Unexplained (Economic) Pay Ratio is associated with a -1.80% 
(1.46%) change in Adj RNOA. The results are robust to alternative measures of accounting 
performance (unadjusted RNOA, industry-adjusted return on assets, and percent change in total 
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sales), to re-estimating the pay ratios using the top five executives’ compensation instead of CEO 
compensation as the numerator, and to controlling for pay disparity among the top five executives 
(the CEO pay slice, calculated following Bebchuk et al. 2011) and for excess CEO pay. In addition, 
much of the negative relation between unexplained disparity and performance is driven by 
instances where the CEO is overpaid and employees are underpaid, suggesting that the 
documented relation is not driven only by a numerator effect (the negative effects of excess CEO 
pay on performance, as shown in Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 1999).5 
Lastly, to gain greater insights into the relation between the Unexplained Pay Ratio and 
firm performance, I examine two additional cross-sectional predictions. First, if the unexplained 
portion of pay disparity reflects an unfair distribution of rents within the firm rather than economic 
factors, I would expect a more pronounced negative relation between the Unexplained Pay Ratio 
and performance when the quality of corporate governance is poor. Using two proxies for weak 
governance (higher Entrenchment Index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2009) and lower 
institutional ownership), I find evidence consistent with this prediction. Second, I examine a 
potential channel through which unexplained pay disparity may affect performance, employee 
turnover. Employees dissatisfied with perceived pay inequity are more likely to leave the firm 
(Bloom and Michel 2002). Replacing these employees is costly (search costs, training new 
employees, short-term decline in productivity) and may have a negative impact on performance. I 
find that the negative relation between the Unexplained Pay Ratio and subsequent firm 
																																								 																				
5 Because compensation, and therefore disparity, is likely determined, in part, by factors related to firm performance, 
I take several steps to overcome concerns about endogeneity. First, in all my regressions, Adj RNOA is measured in 
the subsequent year to mitigate reverse causality concerns (i.e., that performance is driving the ratio). Second, I include 
firm fixed effects in my regressions to control for unobservable time-invariant firm characteristics. Third, I include 
contemporaneous Adj RNOA among the independent variables to control for potential omitted variables (Bova, Kolev, 
Thomas, and Zhang 2015). Fourth, I redo my tests using industry-adjusted ratios (Bebchuk et al. 2011). My inferences 
remain unchanged in all of these specifications. 
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performance is more pronounced in firms with lower employee satisfaction and those facing higher 
employee turnover and tighter labor markets (i.e., firms in industries with more employee mobility 
and thus higher turnover risk). 
This study makes several contributions. First, it extends the literature examining the 
relation between firm-level pay disparity and firm performance, and especially, a series of studies 
examining CEO pay ratios, which have found mixed results (Faleye, Reis, and Venkateswaran 
2013; Crawford, Nelson, and Rountree 2016; Mueller, Ouimet, and Simintzi 2016; Shin, Kang, 
Hyun, and Kim 2015). Instead of relying on measures of total (unadjusted) pay disparity, I separate 
pay disparity driven by economic factors from pay disparity due to other reasons and document a 
different effect on performance, offering a potential explanation for the conflicting results of these 
prior studies.6 Also, my data allow me to examine a broad and fairly representative sample of U.S. 
firms, while prior studies have examined either foreign firms (Mueller et al. 2016; Shin et al. 2015), 
or a subset of U.S. firms providing employee pay data either voluntarily (Faleye et al. 2013) or 
because of industry regulation (such as banks) (Crawford et al. 2016), making their findings less 
generalizable.  
Second, this study contributes to the nascent literature examining how corporate culture 
relates to the firm. There exists a wealth of anecdotal evidence about the importance of corporate 
culture, and recent survey evidence finds that executives believe improving culture increases firm 
																																								 																				
6 The only study I am aware of that attempts to separate expected and unexpected portions of the pay ratio is Shin et 
al. (2015), which finds a negative relation between the unexplained pay ratio and performance for firms in South 
Korea, where disclosure of total employee pay is mandatory. My study offers two key advantages. First, income 
inequality in South Korea is small and, unlike the United States, has been declining during the last 30 years (Cobb 
2016). Indeed, in the Shin et al. sample, the mean ratio of top executives’ pay to average employee pay is only 7. 
Hence, it is a less powerful setting to investigate my research question and raises concerns of generalizability to the 
U.S. setting. Second, the authors identify the unexplained portion of the pay ratio by directly modeling the pay ratio 
as a function of a series of determinants. In contrast, I model separately the expected values of CEO pay (numerator) 
and employee pay (denominator) and use them to estimate the unexplained portion of the pay ratio. As discussed in 
detail in Section 4, my approach allows for a more precise estimate because the economic factors affecting pay 
differ between CEO pay and employee pay.  
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value (Graham, Harvey, Popadak, and Rajgopal 2017). Due in part to a lack of large-scale cross-
sectional data on corporate culture, though, there has been little other empirical research.7 This 
paper provides evidence that pay disparity matters to employee satisfaction, with consequences 
for firm performance. In addition, the results suggest that employees are at least partly aware of 
how economic determinants shape the distribution of compensation and react differently to 
different types of pay disparity. 
Third, my study may have significant implications for practitioners and policymakers. 
Beginning with their 2018 proxy disclosures, firms will be required to report a CEO pay ratio 
based on the pay of the median employee.8 A key concern about this requirement is that numerous 
factors unrelated to pay fairness go into compensation decisions, making it impossible for investor 
to determine what is a “good” or “bad” ratio (e.g., Harsen,  Ward, and Buyniski 2010). My analysis 
highlights how a significant portion of the variation in CEO pay ratios is driven by the denominator 
and draws attention to the importance of controlling for economic factors affecting employee pay. 
In doing so, it provides investors and proxy advisors with a roadmap to interpret pay ratios and 
pay disparity, and may cause regulators and firms to, respectively, mandate and prepare more 
informative disclosures.9  
Lastly, I provide a methodological contribution to researchers interested in using BLS and 
other longitudinal government databases, such as those available through the U.S. Census Bureau. 
One problem preventing broader use of these databases has been researchers’ inability to connect 
																																								 																				
7 The exception is the literature on two components of corporate culture, trust in management and general workplace 
conditions, which have been shown to be related to financial reporting quality and financial performance (Mayer and 
Gavin 2005; Edmans 2011; Goergen, Chahine, Brewster, and Wood 2013; Garrett, Hoitash, and Prawitt 2014) 
8 Note that the new SEC disclosure focuses on median employee compensation. My data do not allow me to identify 
the median employee. 
9 Crawford et al. (2016) provides some evidence that voting shareholders use information about unadjusted CEO pay 
ratios when casting votes on say-on-pay resolutions. A better understanding of the drivers of CEO pay ratios may 
lead to more informed voting decisions. 
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physical business locations to parent companies, making firm-level examinations using these rich 
data sources impossible (Handwerker and Mason 2014).10 I develop a method to effectively 
aggregate these comprehensive establishment-level data to the firm level, creating a new database 
that may be exploited to examine a number of research questions concerning business 
organizations and their employees. 
2. Related literature and prediction development 
 The term “pay disparity” has numerous definitions. Pay disparity can measure the variation 
in pay among people doing the same job (horizontal disparity), the variation in pay between people 
doing different jobs (vertical disparity), or the variation in pay among all workers in an 
organization (overall disparity). Most research to date has focused on the effects of horizontal or 
overall disparity (Gupta et al. 2012; Downes and Choi 2014). Since this study explores the 
characteristics of vertical pay disparity, I restrict most of the discussion in this section to prior 
literature on vertical disparity. Going forward, I use the term “pay disparity” to refer to vertical 
pay disparity unless otherwise noted. 
2.1 Pay disparity in organizations: theory and evidence 
 Much of the empirical literature on pay disparity explicitly tests one of two seemingly 
competing economic theories. Tournament Theory predicts a positive relation between pay 
disparity and worker effort (Lazear and Rosen 1981). Under this theory, as pay disparity between 
job levels increases, the value of receiving a promotion also increases, encouraging greater effort. 
Numerous empirical studies have found support for Tournament Theory when examining, for 
																																								 																				
10 While the Census data provide firm level identifiers for establishments, Handwerker and Mason (2014) find these 
lists to be incomplete. Perhaps more concerning, the authors find in their sample that 62.5% of establishments are 
incorrectly identified as belonging to the firm in question. 
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example, pay disparity among executives in U.S. firms, or among white-collar workers in Europe 
(Main et al. 1993; Heyman 2005; Lee et al. 2008; Kale et al. 2009).  
 Alternatively, Equity Theory states that pay disparity leads to feelings of unfairness, 
resulting in lower-paid employees taking actions detrimental to firm performance, such as shirking 
or quitting (Akerlof and Yellen 1990). Equity Theory relies heavily on psychological research in 
social comparison, which posits that lower-level employees determine the fairness of their 
compensation by judging it, in part, against those above them in the hierarchy (e.g., Martin 1982; 
Dornstein 1988). Employees may care more about their relative pay than their absolute pay, and 
this relation has been shown to be asymmetric, with the dissatisfaction of those at the bottom 
greater than the satisfaction of those at the top (Bloom and Michel 2002; Card, Mas, Moretti, and 
Saez 2012). Several studies find evidence in support of Equity Theory when examining, for 
example, pay disparity among executives in U.S. firms, or among manufacturing workers 
(Cowherd and Levine 1992; Bloom and Michel 2002; Bebchuk et al. 2011).  
While most empirical studies examining pay disparity at the firm level have focused on 
disparity among executives (or among supervisors and their direct reports), recent studies have 
attempted to examine pay disparity between the top level of the organization (CEO) and the 
“average” employee. Given the CEO’s visibility and the detailed information available on CEO 
pay, it has been argued that employees will use CEO pay as a reference in determining the fairness 
of their own compensation, suggesting that CEO pay ratios may be useful summary measures of 
corporate pay disparity (Wade, O’Reilly, and Pollock 2006). Even in these studies, evidence on 
the relation between the CEO pay ratio and organizational performance is mixed.11  
																																								 																				
11 In a sample of U.S. firms (mostly banks) that publicly disclose total employee compensation, Faleye et al. (2013) 
finds a positive relation between the CEO pay ratio and firm performance. Crawford et al. (2016) reports a similar 
finding for U.S. commercial bank holding companies, which are subject to mandatory disclosure of total employee 
pay. In contrast Shin et al. (2015) finds a negative relation for firms in Korea, where disclosure of employee pay is 
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2.2 Toward a better theory: explained versus unexplained pay disparity 
I argue that a potential reason for the inconsistent results in studies of corporate pay 
disparity is that they do not take into account how compensation is determined, and therefore, the 
sources of and reasons for pay disparity. Without controlling for various determinants of CEO and 
employee compensation, when testing Tournament and Equity theories researchers fail to separate 
income inequity, which is the notion that these differences are unfair or perceived as such, from 
income inequality, or the difference in compensation between groups (Trevor et al. 2012). 
Compensation based on measurable attributes related to factors such as performance and labor 
market characteristics creates pay disparity (or income inequality) but may motivate employees to 
perform better — consistent with Tournament Theory — without necessarily creating a perception 
of income inequity since compensation decisions would be viewed as fair reflections of skill and 
effort. In contrast, pay disparity created by factors unrelated to economics, such as the distribution 
of rents or favoritism, may create feelings of resentment, leading to actions that are detrimental to 
the firm, consistent with Equity Theory. To the extent that pay disparity reflects both economic 
and non-economic factors, any association between unadjusted pay ratios and performance could 
be misinterpreted and lead to incorrect inferences.12  
The large increase in the use of performance-based pay in recent decades exacerbates this 
problem. Performance-based pay is designed to distribute compensation based on effort and 
performance, but it also increases pay disparity within an organization as some workers outperform 
others (Lemieux 2008; Trevor et al. 2012). Arguably, pay disparity induced by performance-based 
																																								 																				
mandatory. Mueller et al. (2016), using a proprietary dataset that reports average wages at different job levels for 
each firm, finds a positive relation for a sample of public and private firms in the United Kingdom. As discussed in 
the Introduction, these studies are subject to generalizability concerns. 
12 As Shaw, Gupta, and Delery (2002) puts it, “…[pay] dispersion per se is neither functional nor dysfunctional; 
rather, situational contingencies determine the strategic effectiveness of dispersion (or lack thereof)” (pg. 504). 
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pay is not only consistent with Tournament Theory in that it encourages and rewards effort but is 
also consistent with Equity Theory since the distribution of pay will be perceived as fair and 
equitable because it reflects economic factors and performance.  
2.3 Pay disparity and firm performance: predictions 
The above arguments lead to my main set of predictions: 
P1a: Pay disparity created by unexplained compensation is negatively related to firm 
performance; 
P1b: Pay disparity created by explained compensation is positively related to firm 
performance; 
where unexplained (explained) compensation indicates the portion of compensation driven by non-
economic (economic) factors. 
For a narrow sample, Trevor et al. (2012) tests a similar set of predictions in a horizontal 
pay disparity setting. Examining National Hockey League players, the authors find that pay 
disparity resulting from players’ individual performance (i.e., from an “economic” factor) is 
positively related to team performance, while the relation between pay disparity unexplained by 
individual performance and team performance is either insignificant or marginally negative. 
Fundamentally, my study uses the same intuition and extends this approach to the case of vertical 
pay disparity in the corporate setting. In this setting, two significant challenges arise. First, the set 
of economic factors affecting compensation is substantially more complex than in the case of NHL 
players. Second, when examining vertical pay disparity, it is necessary to identify these factors for 
different types of jobs (i.e., the CEO and the “average employee”). While there is an extensive 
literature on the determinants of CEO pay, modeling the portion of employee compensation driven 
by economic factors across different types of firms with different workforce compositions and 
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operating in different labor markets is a challenging task, both conceptually and in terms of 
obtaining the relevant data.   
2.4 Examining factors that may influence the relation between unexplained pay disparity and firm 
performance 
 In this section, I develop predictions about how the relation between unexplained pay 
disparity and performance may vary in the cross section based on certain firm characteristics. 
2.4.1 The roles of the numerator and denominator in the negative UPR-performance relation 
 The goal of the SEC’s pay ratio disclosure is to give investors and employees insights into 
whether pay within the firm is fair (Menendez 2011). Determining whether pay is fair involves 
comparison within the hierarchy, and pay fairness is expected to have consequences for the firm 
(Martin 1982; Dornstein 1988; Akerlof and Yellen 1990; Bloom and Michel 2002). While prior 
literature has shown that excess CEO pay is negatively related to future firm performance, in the 
context of pay fairness, unexplained employee pay should also influence the relation between 
compensation and performance (Bloom and Michel 2002; Core et al. 2002). If unexplained pay 
disparity is, in part, capturing the distribution of compensation that in unrelated to observable 
economic characteristics, and employees are aware of how economic determinants shape 
compensation, then the negative unexplained pay disparity-performance relation should be 
strongest for firms where unexplained  CEO pay is positive and unexplained employee pay is 
negative, leading to the following prediction:  
P2: The negative relation between unexplained pay disparity and performance is stronger 
when both the CEO is overpaid (positive unexplained pay) and employees are underpaid 
(negative unexplained pay).  
2.4.2 Using corporate governance quality to identify ‘inequitable’ pay disparity  
13 
 
If the unexplained portion of pay disparity reflects, in part, an unfair (i.e., economically 
unjustified) distribution of rents within the firm, I would expect a more pronounced negative 
relation between unexplained pay disparity and performance when corporate governance is weak. 
Put differently, since there is measurement error in my estimate of unexplained pay disparity, one 
may view the subset of firms with greater unexplained pay disparity and poor governance quality 
as having unexplained pay disparity that is more likely to reflect inequity in rents distribution as 
the result of agency problems, and, thus, more likely to negatively affect performance, leading to 
the following prediction:  
P3: The negative relation between unexplained pay disparity and firm performance is 
stronger for firms with weaker governance. 
2.4.3 How does unexplained pay disparity affect performance? The employee turnover channel 
When employees deem that their pay is unfair, Equity Theory predicts that they will take 
actions to recoup their compensation in ways that are detrimental to the firm, such as shirking 
(Akerlof and Yellen 1990). Among others, a specific channel through which unexplained disparity 
may lead to decreased firm performance is turnover, which is costly to the firm in terms of search 
and training of new employees, and reduced productivity in the short term. Bloom and Michel 
(2002) finds empirical evidence that greater pay disparity among firm managers leads to a higher 
likelihood of turnover. The willingness to quit in response to unjustified pay disparity, though, is 
likely partially determined by an employee’s outside options. When the labor market is tighter 
(i.e., more job openings and fewer layoffs), it is less risky for employees to quit in response to 
perceived pay inequity since the probability of getting a new job is greater. These arguments lead 
to the following predictions: 
14 
 
P4a: The negative relation between unexplained pay disparity and firm performance is 
stronger for firms with lower employee satisfaction; 
P4b: The negative relation between unexplained pay disparity and firm performance is 
stronger for firms with higher employee turnover; 
P4c: The negative relation between unexplained pay disparity and firm performance is 
stronger for firms in industries with tighter labor markets.  
3. Compensation data 
 One significant challenge of examining questions related to non-executive compensation 
at the firm level is a lack of available data. As stated above, studies have relied on data from 
voluntary disclosures, specific industries where disclosures are mandated, or countries with 
disclosure mandates, but generalizability is a concern in these studies (e.g., Faleye et al. 2013; Shin 
et al. 2015; Crawford et al. 2016). While BLS and other government agencies make compensation 
data available to academic researchers, aggregating these data to the firm level poses a significant 
challenge (Handwerker and Mason 2014). Below, I describe the data I use and the technique I 
apply to effectively aggregate non-executive compensation data to the firm level for a large sample 
of publicly traded firms. 
This study relies on two confidential databases maintained by the BLS, the Quarterly 
Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) and the Occupational Employment Statistics survey 
(OES), both of which cover almost every employee in the United States. QCEW reports two items 
at the establishment-quarter level relevant to this study, total establishment compensation and total 
number of employees.13 Establishment compensation includes salaries, cash bonuses, share-based 
																																								 																				
13 The QCEW database is created at the state level, and states must grant permission to outside researchers to use the 
data. Several states grant access either on a case-by-case basis or not at all. The states that refused access for this 
project are Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, and Wyoming. 
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compensation, profit sharing pay, and gratuities paid during the quarter. OES reports detailed 
information on the types of jobs and the number of people working in those jobs in each 
establishment, which allows for the measurement of economically meaningful establishment 
characteristics. All employees included in OES are classified into one of 840 Standard 
Occupational Classification (SOC) codes, as defined by BLS.14 
3.1 Creating a firm-level database 
 Aggregating BLS establishment data to the firm level in a large sample is a significant 
challenge because establishments do not share common firm-level identifiers. In addition, 
establishment names, which can vary for establishments in the same firm, do not allow for 
structured merging to the firm level (Handwerker and Mason 2014).15 Below, I describe a multi-
step process that enables me to overcome these challenges through the merging of several 
databases and hand checking of results. A similar methodology can be implemented for future 
firm-level studies that rely on BLS data. Figure 1 provides a graphical explanation of how the 
databases are merged. Table 1 describes how the number of firms and establishments in the sample 
changes in each step. 
 The goal of this process is to attach a common firm-level identifier (GVKEY) to each 
establishment belonging to that firm. I begin by merging Compustat, CRSP, and Execucomp on 
common identifiers to create the possible universe of firm-years with available data (the “financial 
database” in Figure 1). I drop all firm-years with missing relevant data and those with CEO 
																																								 																				
14 OES also reports wage information, but because establishments are surveyed randomly and sporadically, creating 
a time series at the establishment level is impossible, as is creating meaningful firm-year measures since 
establishments in the same firm aren’t necessarily surveyed in the same period. For my measures using OES that are 
described in Section 4.1, I require establishments to be surveyed at least once in my sample period, and match the 
variables from OES to the most recent establishment-year in QCEW.  
15 One approach to match firms to BLS establishments is to use ReferenceUSA, as in Michaels, Page, and Whited 
(2015). However, this approach is prohibitively expensive for a large sample because it requires payment for each 
establishment. 
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turnover. Next, I scrape the SEC’s EDGAR FTP server for Exhibit 21 of all firms’ 10-Ks to extract 
a list of subsidiaries, as well as the firm’s CIK identifier and filing date. In Step 1, I merge GVKEY, 
fiscal year end date, headquarters address, headquarter geographic coordinates, website address, 
and IRS Employer Identification Number (EIN) from the financial database to each subsidiary 
name (from Exhibit 21) belonging to the same firm in the same year.  
Next, I merge these data with Factual, a database of approximately 20 million U.S. business 
establishment addresses. Factual’s database includes the establishment business name, its address, 
its website, its geographic coordinates, and its “chain name,” or the name of the company that 
owns the establishment, where available. In Step 2, I first normalize the text in both databases, 
removing words and abbreviations like “co.” and “corp.” from company names, as well as making 
address abbreviations and website addresses consistent (e.g., removing “http://” from the start of 
all websites). I then merge the data by matching, in order, website addresses, geographic 
coordinates, physical addresses, and chain names. For establishments where I do not find a 
successful match on this first merge, using the SequenceMatcher fuzzy matching tool in Python’s 
difflib package, I do another merge on company, subsidiary, and establishment name, dropping all 
matches that score below 0.85 (out of 1). These techniques yield 550,828 successful matches. I 
then hand check all of the name-based matches since fuzzy matching leads to false positives.16 
After hand checking, I am left with 215,808 successful matches that include establishment name, 
address and geographical coordinates, parent company name, GVKEY, and parent EIN (which 
may differ from establishment EIN, as shown in Handwerker and Mason 2014). 
 In Step 3, these data are uploaded to the BLS server and merged with QCEW by, in order, 
EIN, geographic coordinates, establishment address, and fuzzy matching of establishment name 
																																								 																				
16 Three research assistants assisted with the hand checking of the data. When it was uncertain whether a match was 
correct, Google search and Google Streetview were used to confirm the match. 
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(before the merge, I normalize the QCEW database using a process similar to the one described 
above). This merge is hand checked again. Finally, in Step 4, I merge the OES data on unique BLS 
establishment identifiers. The resulting database contains establishment-level variables as 
described below, as well as unique firm identifiers and fiscal year-end date, making aggregation 
to the firm-year level trivial. The process yields a firm-year database consisting of 21,852 
establishments (104,748 establishment-years) for 931 unique firms (5,208 firm-years) from 2006 
to 2013. It is important to note that BLS provides air-gapped computers to researchers to protect 
the confidential data it collects. Thus, all outside data and statistical outputs must be, respectively, 
uploaded and downloaded by BLS staff. 
4. Modeling employee pay and CEO pay 
 One goal of this paper is to identify the portion of pay disparity explained by economic 
factors and the portion unexplained by these factors. To do so, I subtract from the Simple Pay 
Ratio (total CEO pay/total mean employee pay) an estimate of what I call the Economic Pay Ratio, 
or EPR, which is the ratio of the explained portion of CEO pay to the explained portion of 
employee pay. This requires that I separately model explained CEO pay (numerator) and explained 
employee pay (denominator). For the former, I largely rely on the extensive literature on CEO pay. 
For the latter, I use the establishment-level employee compensation database described above. 
Note that an alternative approach would be to directly estimate the explained component 
of the Simple Pay Ratio (as in Shin et al. 2015) and use the residual to capture the unexplained 
portion of the Simple Pay Ratio (my proxy for firm-level pay disparity). However, this approach 
assumes that the researcher can model the determinants of the pay ratio. In reality, different 
economic forces drive the CEO labor market and employees’ labor markets, making it difficult to 
properly capture them both in a single model of the CEO pay ratio. By separating the numerator 
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and denominator, and building a “bottom up” model of employee pay from the establishment-level 
compensation data, my approach allows for a more precise estimation of the two components of 
the ratio and, thus, its unexplained portion.  
4.1 Modeling establishment-level employee compensation 
Based on insights from prior studies (e.g. Groshen 1991a, 1991b) and taking advantage of 
my establishment-level data, I model mean employee pay at the establishment level as follows: !"#$	&#'(,*,+ = - + /0123#4562ℎ8"$3	9#:3;<2(,*,+0 + /=!#:<;":;$;86:	9#:3;<2(,*,+=+ />?6<8	9#:3;<2(,+@A + 6$BC23<'	96D"B	"99":32 + '"#<	96D"B	"99":32>+ E,						(1) 
where, for each establishment, Mean pay is the average yearly employee compensation calculated 
as the total yearly employees’ compensation divided by the average number of employees during 
the year, as reported in QCEW. Establishment factors, Macroeconomic factors, and Firm factors 
are, respectively, a vector of establishment-level, local macroeconomic-level, and firm-level 
variables hypothesized to be associated with employees’ pay. Industries are defined by the two-
digit SIC code. Subscript i is the firm identifier, j is the establishment identifier, and t is the fiscal 
year. The compensation predicted by this regression is the explained component of mean 
compensation, whereas	E captures the component not explained by the model. Table 2 describes 
the predicted relation between Mean pay and each of the factors, which are detailed below. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Establishment factors include the following establishment-level variables constructed from 
the BLS databases (OES and/or QCEW): the percent of employees working, respectively, in 
research and development jobs (R&D emp pct), non-R&D technology fields (Tech emp pct), non-
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retail sales (Sales emp pct), retail (Retail emp pct), non-financial services (Services emp pct), and 
manufacturing-related jobs (Manufact emp pct).17 These categories are mutually exclusive in the 
sense that each employee can be classified as being in only one of these five groups. I also construct 
a corresponding set of indicators equal to 1 if an establishment has any R&D workers (R&D 
indicator), non-R&D technology workers (Tech indicator), non-retail sales workers (Sales 
indicator), retail workers (Retail indicator), non-financial services workers (Services indicator), 
and manufacturing workers (Manufact indicator). Including these indicators allows me to control 
for the effect of the presence of certain types of employees on the establishment’s overall 
compensation practices, regardless of their numbers. 
In addition, I include the percent of employees with supervisory duties (Pct supervisor) 
and construct an indicator equal to 1 if the BLS database reports that executives work in the 
establishment (Exec indicator).18 Finally, Ch emp is the percent change in the number of 
employees from the previous year. All variables are measured using OES data except for Ch emp, 
which is measured using QCEW. See the Appendix for detailed definitions. 
The above variables are hypothesized to affect establishment-level mean employee pay. 
For example, all else being equal, I expect the presence of a larger fraction of R&D or technology 
employees in the establishment to be associated with higher employee pay, since these employees 
have specialized skills. In contrast, I expect a higher presence of low-skilled workers (e.g. retail, 
																																								 																				
17 All establishments are required to report to the BLS the number of employees working in each of the 840 SOC job 
codes. The codes used in the compensation model were chosen for two reasons. First, there is a clear prediction of 
their relation to compensation. Second, they are among the most common job categories in my sample and are 
present across multiple industries. 
18 I do not include an indicator corresponding to Pct supervisor because each establishment has at least one 
employee with a supervisor role. As for Exec indicator, I do not include the percentage of employees classified as 
top executives because it is extremely small and usually for each firm only one or a few establishments include top 
executives. 
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non-financial services) to result in lower mean employee pay at the establishment level (see Table 
2 for more details). 
Macroeconomic factors include the following local macroeconomic variables related to the 
labor market, measured at the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Area closest to the 
establishment: the industry-region average compensation (Ind-region comp) and the percent of 
residents who graduated from college (Col grad). I also include an indicator equal to 1 if the 
establishment is located in a state that has passed a “Right to Work” law (Right to work).19 All 
variables are publicly available through the U.S. Census Bureau, except Right to work, which is 
hand collected. Since pay levels are shaped by the labor market, average employee pay in the same 
region and industry should be positively related to establishment compensation. Hence, I expect a 
positive association between Ind-region comp and Mean pay. In contrast, “Right to Work” laws 
have been shown to weaken union influence, and union presence has been found to be positively 
associated with employee pay levels (e.g., Cowherd and Levine 1992; Lemieux 2008). Thus, I 
expect a negative association between Right to work and Mean pay.  
Finally, as for the Firm factors, I include several firm characteristics generally known to 
affect compensation: size (Ln assets, the natural log of total assets), age (Ln age, the natural log of 
the number of years since the firm first appeared in CRSP), R&D intensity (R&D/sales, research 
and development costs scaled by total sales), profitability (Adj RNOA, industry-adjusted return on 
net operating assets), volatility (RNOA var, the rolling five-year standard deviation of Adj RNOA), 
Labor productivity (total sales divided by total employees), Capital intensity (capital expenditures 
divided by total sales), Leverage (total debt divided by total assets) and growth options (BTM, the 
book-to-market ratio). All variables are from Compustat except Ln age. All continuous variables 
																																								 																				
19 “Right to work” laws prohibit agreements that set strict conditions on the unionization of certain jobs, making it 
more difficult to create and grow union representation. 
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listed above are winsorized at 1% and 99% to reduce the influence of outliers. See the Appendix 
for detailed variable descriptions.20 
One concern with my data and my model is that I lack data on individual wages and 
individual characteristics, such as education level, tenure, race, and gender, that may explain such 
wages (e.g., Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 1999). Several studies, though, suggest that this may 
not be a serious concern (e.g. Groshen 1991a; Groshen 1991b; Barth, Bryson, Davis, and Freeman 
2014). A persistent result in the literature on wages is that where a person works (i.e., industry, 
firm, and establishment) is the strongest predictor of wage variation. For example, Groshen 
(1991a) finds that the establishment where a person works explains more of intraindustry wage 
differentials than the individual characteristics of employees. Groshen (1991b) shows that 
establishment and occupation explain 90% of compensation for manufacturing workers and that a 
random change in job is associated with a 10-15% change in compensation. In addition, recent 
research has shown that establishment and firm characteristics have been largely responsible for 
the growth in income inequality in recent years.21 Consistent with these studies, as shown in 
Section 5.2, the explanatory power of my model is relatively high.   
4.2 Modeling CEO compensation 
 Based on an extensive literature that examines how firm-level economic determinants 
relate to CEO compensation (e.g., Core et al. 1999; Gipper 2016), I model CEO pay as follows: 
																																								 																				
20 Firm factors, as well as the establishment-level factor Ch emp, are measured in year t-1 since QCEW reports 
compensation when it is paid (rather than when it is earned). As such, compensation paid in year t is, in part, a 
function of firm characteristics (e.g., performance) in t-1. 
21 Barth et al. (2014) provides evidence that the growth in pay dispersion in the United States has been due to 
changes in dispersion between establishments, as opposed to within establishments. Similarly, Song, Price, 
Guvenen, Bloom, and von Wachter (2015) finds that almost all of the rise in the dispersion in earnings from 1978 to 
2012 can be attributed to growing dispersion between firms, while dispersion within firms has remained stable. 
22 
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where subscripts are defined as above. CEO pay is total compensation, as measured by 
Execucomp. Since CEOs have decision-making power for both operations and financing, I include 
industry-adjusted ROA (Adj ROA) as a measure of accounting profitability. A significant portion 
of CEO compensation comes from share-based compensation, so stock returns (Ret) should 
positively influence compensation, and firms with noisier measures of performance, as measured 
by the standard deviation in monthly returns for the prior 60 months (Ret var) and the standard 
deviation in Adj ROA for the prior five years (ROA var), should provide stronger incentives (Core 
et al. 1999). Ln CEO tenure and Ln CEO age are the natural log of the number of years the CEO 
has served in that position and the CEO’s age, respectively, and are expected to be positively 
related to pay. Outside CEO, an indicator equal to 1 if the CEO came from outside the firm, should 
be positively associated with pay. Loss is an indicator equal to 1 when net income is negative, a 
proxy for poor performance. Ln assets is a measure of size, which is a proxy for CEO talent and 
firm complexity (Core et al. 1999). The book-to-market ratio is strongly negatively correlated with 
profitability. Since more profitable firms pay more, I expect BTM to be negatively related to 
compensation (Abowd et al. 1999). Leverage measures the riskiness of the firm, as well as its 
ability to pay, so I do not predict the sign of the relation with compensation.22 See the Appendix 
for detailed definitions of all variables. 
																																								 																				
22 Unlike the variables used in the establishment-level model, here I regress contemporaneous independent variables 
on total CEO compensation since CEO compensation, as reported in Execucomp, includes incentive compensation 
based on contemporaneous firm characteristics. 
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5. Empirical analysis 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3, Panel A provides descriptive statistics comparing the firms in my sample to the 
rest of the firms in Execucomp (which covers approximately the S&P 1,500 firms) for the 2006-
2013 period. My sample covers 40.3% (5,082/12,607) of the firm-year observations in 
Execucomp. For most of the firm characteristics discussed earlier, the differences are statistically 
significant but economically small. For example, mean total assets (Assets) is $15.4 billion for my 
sample and $13.5 billion for the other firms in Execucomp. Book-to-market (BTM) is 0.53 for my 
sample and 0.57 for the other firms in Execucomp. Industry composition is also similar (Table 3, 
Panel B), except that my sample has a greater (smaller) proportion of firms in the machinery and 
business equipment (financial services) sector. Overall, Table 3 suggests that my sample is 
representative of the S&P 1,500 firms.   
Table 4, Panel A provides descriptive statistics on the establishment-level variables. On 
average, each establishment has 80 employees. The mean employee compensation (Mean pay) 
averages $42,070/year, with a median of $27,160 and a standard deviation of $40,170. The 
substantial variation in this variable has important implications for the interpretation of the CEO 
pay ratio data that firms will start disclosing in 2018. It suggests that variation in the CEO pay 
ratio is not only the effect of variation in CEO pay, but also variation in employee pay. As noted 
below, to the extent that such variation reflects differences in economic factors (i.e. composition 
of workforce), for the ratio to provide useful and comparable information, it is essential to 
understand the drivers of employee pay across industries and firms.  
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R&D (technology) employees are present in 14.8% (17.3%) of establishments. Retail 
employees and non-financial services employees are present in 46.7% and 40.4% of 
establishments, respectively, suggesting that many of the sample establishments are businesses 
such as chain stores and restaurants, which is unsurprising, given the prevalence of retail 
establishments and restaurants across all regions of the United States. Table 4, Panel B supports 
this result, showing that 42.8% of establishments are in the retail industry. 
I next look at how Mean pay varies across establishments depending on workforce 
composition. Table 4, Panel C shows that establishments where work is conducted by R&D, 
technology, non-retail sales, and manufacturing workers, and executive employees have 
significantly higher compensation, while those that employ retail and services workers have 
significantly lower compensation, on average. These univariate statistics confirm most of the 
workforce composition predictions in Table 2. More importantly, they highlight the denominator-
induced problems in comparing CEO pay ratios across firms. The executive pay literature has long 
established that CEO pay levels (the numerator) cannot be compared across firms without taking 
into account key determinants, such as size, performance, and industry. This study highlights an 
analogous denominator-induced problem: Average employee pay levels cannot be compared 
across establishments/firms without taking into account differences in economic factors explaining 
employee pay, such as the composition of the workforce. Two firms with similar CEO pay levels 
but differences in workforce composition will have substantially different mean/median employee 
pay, leading to potentially large, misleading differences in (unadjusted) CEO pay ratios. 
Table 4, Panel D reports the correlation matrix for my establishment-, macroeconomic-, 
and firm-level variables at the establishment level, with Pearson correlations below the diagonal 
and Spearman correlations above. The correlations between Mean pay and the establishment-level 
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variables are generally consistent with the univariate differences in Panel B. A strong correlation 
exists between Ind-region comp and Mean pay (Spearman correlation of 0.54), suggesting that the 
industry-region average employee pay measure, publicly available through the U.S. Census 
Bureau, can offer some guidance when firm and establishment compensation data are unavailable. 
Turning to firm-level variables, a strong positive relation exists between Mean pay and firm size, 
age, R&D intensity, and labor productivity, suggesting that firm-level characteristics are also 
important in understanding employee pay at the establishment level. 
5.2 Determinants of establishment-level employee pay and CEO pay 
 Table 5, Panel A reports the results of implementing the establishment-level employee 
compensation model described in Equation (1). Column (1) presents the relation between Mean 
pay and the establishment-level variables. Remarkably, these variables explain more than half of 
the variation in Mean pay (adjusted r-squared of 52.5%), confirming the importance of accounting 
for establishment-level factors when comparing employee pay across establishments. Columns (2) 
and (3) add the macroeconomic and firm-level variables, respectively. Column (4) includes 
industry and year fixed effects and is the specification I will use to calculate explained employee 
pay. The adjusted r-squared increases across the columns, up to 61.1% in column (4), showing that 
the additional variables have incremental explanatory power. 
Focusing on Column (4), the independent variables are significantly related to 
compensation in the direction predicted in Table 2. For example, for the establishment variables, 
the coefficient on R&D emp pct, 53.36, is significant at the 1% level, providing evidence that a 
higher proportion of R&D workers in an establishment is associated with higher mean 
compensation. The relation between Mean pay and the establishment variables is largely consistent 
with the results in Table 4, Panel C. Examining macroeconomic variables, I find that Ind-region 
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comp (Right to work) is positive (negative) and significant at the 1% (5%) level, as predicted. 
Turning to the firm-level variables, the coefficients on both Adj RNOA and Labor productivity are 
positive and significant at greater than 1%, consistent with greater average employee pay in firms 
with better performance and a more productive workforce.23 
 Panel B of Table 5 reports the results for the CEO compensation model in Equation (2). 
The adjusted r-squared for the model is 56.3%. Consistent with prior studies, Ln assets is the 
strongest predictor of CEO pay, with a t statistic of 64.91. The coefficients on contemporaneous 
stock performance is not statistically significant, but the measures of lagged returns, accounting 
profitability and volatility (ROA and ROA var) are positive and significant as predicted. 
5.3 Explained and unexplained pay ratios 
 The Simple Pay Ratio, or SPR, is calculated as: 
]^M(,+ = I1J	&#'(,+!"#$	&#'(,+ ,						(3) 
where Mean pay is mean establishment compensation aggregated to the firm level as follows: 
!"#$	&#'(,+ = (!"#$	&#'(,*,+ ×3;3	"8&(,*,+)3;3	"8&(,*,+ ,					(4) 
and all subscripts are defined as above.  
Similarly, the Explained Pay Ratio, or EPR, is calculated as: 
1^M(,+ = 1D&5#6$"B	I1J	&#'(,+1D&5#6$"B	8"#$	&#'(,+ ,						(5) 
where Explained CEO pay is the predicted compensation from running the regression described in 
Equation (2), and Explained mean pay is calculated as in Equation (4), except the pay component 
																																								 																				
23 Since several of the variables in these regressions are strongly correlated, I check for multicollinearity by 
measuring the tolerance (1/variance inflation factor) of relations among the variables. The lowest tolerance is 0.278, 
well above the 0.1 that would warrant concern.   
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of the numerator (Mean pay) is the predicted compensation from running the establishment-level 
regression described in Equation (1). 
 Finally, I compute the unexplained ratio as the difference between the actual ratio and the 
explained ratio.24 c^M(,+ = ]^M(,+ − 1^M(,+.						(6) 
5.3.1 Pay ratios: descriptive statistics 
 Table 6, Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the pay ratios and firm-level variables 
of interest. Mean SPR is 101.5.25 Mean EPR is 72.7, and UPR is 23.3. That the majority of SPR is 
explained by economic factors suggests that ignoring these factors when examining the relation 
between pay disparity and firm performance could lead to false inferences. The medians of the 
ratios are much lower than the means, with the median UPR just slightly positive (at 7.0). Because 
of this positive skewness, I use the natural logs of the ratios in my main analyses to reduce the 
influence of outliers.26 On average, the number of employees covered by my sample is 44.3% of 
the total number of employees reported in Compustat (variable Emp pct). The main reason for the 
gap is that, as discussed earlier, I was unable to collect all U.S. establishments due to states limiting 
access. Also, I do not have international employees in my sample, and my matching algorithm is 
unlikely to be perfectly accurate. In robustness tests, I rerun my main regressions below using only 
firms with above median Emp pct and find that this increases mean Emp pct to 74.1% without 
																																								 																				
24 An alternative approach to calculating UPR would be to compute the unexplained ratio as the ratio of the 
differences between actual and explained pay (i.e., unexplained CEO pay divided by unexplained employee pay). 
However, such an approach could lead to negative numbers in the numerator and/or denominator, making 
interpretation of the ratio impossible. 
25 Media articles often report a CEO pay ratio greater than 300 (e.g., Globalist 2013). The reasons for the difference 
between this estimate and mean SPR are threefold. First, I use mean compensation instead of median. Second, I use 
actual employee compensation data, whereas media articles often refer to industry or survey data. Third, media 
estimates include only firms in the S&P 500, which are larger firms, with higher CEO pay and thus higher ratios. 
Mean SPR among firms in the S&P 500 in my sample is 175.1. 
26 When using unlogged ratios, my results remain unchanged. 
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altering my results, providing evidence that the subset of excluded employees does not introduce 
any systematic bias. 
 Table 6, Panel B reports the correlation matrix of my firm-level variables of interest with 
Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal. Focusing on Spearman correlations 
due to the skewness of my measures, there is a strong relation between SPR and EPR, at 0.51. The 
correlation between UPR and SPR is positive at 0.45, while the correlation between UPR and EPR 
is negative at -0.24. It is important to highlight the pay ratios’ correlations with CEO pay. While 
the correlation between CEO Pay and SPR is highly positive at 0.77, as expected, it is only 0.49 
for EPR and, importantly, only 0.10 for UPR, suggesting that CEO pay is unlikely to drive any 
effect of UPR on performance. As expected, higher Mean pay is associated with lower values of 
the three pay ratios. Unsurprisingly, given the correlation between size and CEO pay, SPR also is 
strongly correlated with Ln assets (0.50), while UPR’s correlation with size is weaker (0.04). 
Supporting predictions 1a and 1b, the correlation between performance (Adj RNOA) and EPR 
(UPR) is positive (negative) at 0.05 (-0.03).27 
5.3.2 Validating the Unexplained Pay Ratio 
 To validate my estimate of the Unexplained Pay Ratio as a measure of pay fairness, I 
examine its correlation with three measures of employee satisfaction. The underlying premise is 
that if my estimate of UPR does capture the portion of the pay ratio that would be viewed as 
“unjustified,” it should be correlated with proxies for employee satisfaction. The first proxy is 
Fortune, an indicator equal to 1 if a firm was chosen as one of Fortune magazine’s “100 Best 
Places to Work” in a particular year. These (and similar) data have been used as proxies for 
employee satisfaction and trust in management in a number of studies examining how employee 
																																								 																				
27 These correlations are qualitatively similar when examining logged values of the ratios. 
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attitudes relate to firm performance and firm value (e.g., Ballou, Godwin, and Shortridge 2003; 
Edmans 2011; Garrett et al. 2014).28  
The second measure, JUST fair pay, is a continuous variable I calculate using data from 
JUST Capital, a non-profit organization that analyzes firms based on their environmental, social, 
and governance behaviors using a variety of public and commercial databases. In particular, I focus 
on a subset of four measures related to employee compensation: the number of employees earning 
a living wage, the commitment of the firm to combating pay discrimination, the fairness of 
compensation compared to others doing similar work, and the gap between executive 
compensation and compensation of other employees.29 I take the average of these four measures, 
all of which are normalized to have a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 20. A higher value 
indicates that pay is perceived to be more fairly distributed throughout the organization. 
The third measure, Turnover, is a proxy for employee turnover calculated following Carter 
and Lynch (2004) as total cancelled employee stock options (ESOs) in year t+1 divided by 
outstanding ESOs in year t. If employees are dissatisfied with compensation structure, one option 
they have is to leave the firm.30 
In Table 7, I regress each of the three measures of satisfaction on my estimate of Ln UPR, 
the natural log of UPR. I find that firms with higher Ln UPR are less likely to be ranked in the 
Fortune 100 Best Places to Work (logit regression in Column (1)), score lower in the composite 
JUST Capital measure (OLS regression in Column (3)), and have higher future turnover (OLS 
																																								 																				
28 Inclusion in the Fortune list is based on two components, employee responses to a survey and an outside 
evaluation of factors related to a firm’s treatment of its employees (Edmans 2011). 
29 Compensation of non-executive employees is approximated by JUST Capital using data from Glassdoor, publicly 
available BLS industry compensation information, and other public sources.  
30 This is an admittedly crude proxy for employee turnover. Among other issues, it assumes that all firms use stock 
options to compensate lower level employees. However, Carter and Lynch (2004) shows a strong correlation 
between this measure, calculated at the industry level, and actual industry-level employee turnover. 
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regression in Column (6)), providing support for the validity of my estimate of UPR. 31 The results 
for Fortune and Just fair pay are similar in Columns (2) and (4) when controlling for a number of 
firm characteristics (detailed in the next section). Note that I use the natural log of all ratios in this 
test and all tests going forward to mitigate concerns about positive skewness.32 
While UPR is measured with noise, these results provide evidence that my measure is 
capturing the intended construct, that of pay fairness. Importantly, the negative relation between 
employee satisfaction and unexplained pay disparity suggests that employees understand, in part, 
how different components of compensation (e.g., earned pay versus unfair rent extraction) shape 
the distribution of compensation, and that they react negatively to disparity that is unrelated to 
economic factors.  
5.4 Pay ratios and firm performance 
 Having validated my estimate of Ln UPR, I next turn to my main analysis, examining the 
relations between the pay ratios and subsequent firm performance using the following multivariate 
regression: KBL	MgJK+hA = /AT$	&#'	<#36;+ + /NKBL	MgJK+ + /PT$	#22"32+ + /QZ[!+ + /RT"O"<#V"++ /ST#4;<	&<;BC:36O63'+ + /UI#&63#5	6$3"$263'+ + /WT$	#V"++ '"#<	96D"B	"99":32 + 96<8	96D"B	"99":32 + E.					(7) 
The coefficient of interest, /A, captures the association between the pay ratio and subsequent 
performance. While my focus is mostly on Ln UPR (the natural log of the Unexplained Pay Ratio), 
for completeness I also examine Ln SPR (the natural log of the unadjusted Simple Pay Ratio) and 
																																								 																				
31 Because inclusion on the Fortune list is sticky and Just fair pay is measured only once for each firm, I am unable 
to include firm fixed effects in these regressions. 
32 Because UPR can be positive or negative, I calculate Ln UPR as Ln SPR – Ln EPR. 
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Ln EPR (the natural log of the Economic Pay Ratio, based on the explained portions of CEO and 
employee pay). All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
My key performance metric is Adj RNOA, the industry-adjusted return on net operating 
assets. This measure captures a firm’s return on invested capital, exclusive of financing decisions. 
Similar to prior studies, I control for a number of firm characteristics that can potentially affect 
future profitability and may also be related to the pay ratios, such as firm size (Ln assets), firm age 
(Ln age), book-to-market ratio (BTM), Leverage, total sales scaled by total number of employees 
reported in Compustat (Labor productivity), and capital expenditures scaled by total assets 
(Capital intensity). 
 Table 8, Panel A presents the results from testing Equation (7) with and without control 
variables. Columns (1) and (5) fail to provide evidence of a significant relation between Adj RNOA 
and Ln SPR. In Columns (2) and (6), the coefficient on Ln UPR is negative and significant. In 
Column (6), the coefficient on UPR is -0.0013, significant at greater than 5%. I find similar 
significance but an opposite relation for Ln EPR in Columns (3) and (7) with a t statistic of 2.96 
for Column (7). Economically, these results are also significant. In untabulated tests, when using 
unlogged ratios, I find that a one standard deviation increase in UPR (EPR) is associated with a -
1.80% (1.46%) change in Adj RNOA. These results are consistent with predictions 1a and 1b. 
Note that because firm performance and compensation decisions likely are jointly 
determined, I take steps to alleviate concerns about endogeneity. To mitigate simultaneity, Adj 
RNOA is measured in year t+1 in all my regressions, with Adj RNOAt included as an independent 
variable in all regressions to control for omitted variables (Bova et al. 2015). I include firm fixed 
effects to control for time-invariant firm characteristics and year fixed effects to control for 
aggregate time-series trends. Finally, following Bebchuk et al. (2011), Table 8, Panel B reports 
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the results from testing Equation (7) with the logged ratios replaced by industry-adjusted logged 
ratios. Industry-adjusted ratios are calculated as (firm-year ratio – industry-year ratio), where 
industry is defined by two-digit SIC code. The above inferences remain unchanged in this 
specification.33 
In robustness tests (untabulated), I test whether my results are sensitive to how accounting 
performance is measured. To do so, I replace Adj RNOA in Equation (4) with Adj ROA. In these 
regressions, the t statistic for Ln UPR (Ln EPR) is -1.69 (2.00) and statistically significant at greater 
than 10% (5%). In addition, I replace the dependent variable with RNOA that is not industry 
adjusted, as well as contemporaneous industry-adjusted RNOA. Because compensation influences 
these accounting ratios, I also redo my main analysis using Ch rev, the percent change in revenue, 
perhaps a more crude measure of performance but one that excludes compensation. Finally, I 
calculate my ratios using top-five executive pay in the numerator and conduct my main analyses 
again. In all of these tests, the results remain unchanged. 
5.5 Examining the drivers of the negative relation between unexplained pay disparity and 
performance 
The previous analyses show that unexplained pay disparity (as measured by Ln UPR) has 
a negative association with firm performance. One question that remains is, what roles do the 
numerator (CEO pay) and the denominator (mean employee pay) play in this relation? As shown 
in Table 9, Panel A, there are four possible combinations of overpaid/underpaid CEO and 
overpaid/underpaid employees, but when both are overpaid or underpaid, UPR can be positive or 
																																								 																				
33 To further allay concerns about endogeneity, in untabulated analyses I conduct two-stage least squares regressions 
using  industry (two-digit SIC code) median pay ratios as instruments for the ratios, since industry is exogenously 
determined and pay levels and structure are likely to be similar within industries (Bebchuk et al. 2011; Kale et al. 
2009; Murphy 1999). I expect this variable to be positively related to the firm-level ratio but be uncorrelated with 
the error term. My inferences remain unchanged in these analyses. 
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negative, leading to six scenarios. For example, consider the case where both the CEO and 
employees are underpaid (relative to the corresponding expected pay models). In this case, UPR 
will be positive if the employees are underpaid more than the CEO is (Case 1), and negative if 
they are underpaid less than the CEO is (Case 2) (since UPR = SPR – EPR). Similarly, consider 
the case where both the CEO and employees are overpaid: UPR will be positive if the CEO is 
overpaid more than employees (Case 6), and negative if the CEO is overpaid less than employees 
(Case 5). 34 Finally, UPR will be unambiguously positive if the CEO is overpaid and the employees 
are underpaid (Case 3) and unambiguously negative if the CEO is underpaid and the employees 
overpaid (Case 4).  
Analyzing these six combinations can shed light on whether the relation between UPR and 
firm performance is driven by cases where the CEO is overpaid (numerator effect), regardless of 
employee pay, or by combinations of unexplained pay at both the CEO and employee level.35 To 
do so, I assign firms to one of the six categories described in Table 9, Panel A. Then, I examine 
whether indicator and semi-continuous variables capturing each of the six possible combinations 
are related to Adj RNOA. Table 9, Panel B reports the results of regressing indicators (interactions 
between indicators and Ln UPR) on Adj RNOA in Column (1) (Column (2)). I find that the negative 
relation between Ln UPR and subsequent performance is largely driven by Case 3, that is, firms 
where the CEO is overpaid and employees are underpaid, suggesting that the interaction between 
																																								 																				
34 Because UPR is calculated as SPR – EPR, when the residuals from the expected pay models are of the same sign 
for both CEO pay and employee pay, the sign of UPR can be either positive or negative, depending on which 
residual is larger in percentage terms. Consider the following example where both the CEO and employees are 
overpaid, but the CEO is overpaid more in percentage terms: Actual (expected) CEO pay is $5 million ($2.5 million) 
and actual (expected) mean employee pay is $50,000 ($45,000). That is, the CEO is overpaid by 100% and 
employees by 11.1%. Then SPR=100, EPR=55.5, and UPR=45.5. Next, consider the case where both the CEO and 
employees are overpaid, but the CEO is overpaid less in percentage terms: Actual (expected) CEO pay is $5 million 
($4.5 million) and actual (expected) mean employee pay is $50,000 ($25,000). That is, the CEO is overpaid by 
11.1% and employees by 100%. Then SPR=100, EPR=185, and UPR=-80. UPR will be 0 when CEO and employees 
are overpaid (or underpaid) by the same percentage. 
35 Prior literature has shown that excess CEO pay is negatively related to firm performance (e.g., Core et al. 1999). 
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the numerator and denominator plays an important role in this relation and providing further 
evidence that Ln UPR is capturing, in part, the concept of pay fairness, consistent with prediction 
2. These results also suggest that employees take into account economic factors determining pay 
when reacting to how compensation is distributed within the firm. 
Case 4 (firms with underpaid CEOs and overpaid employees) is also of interest. In Column 
(1), the coefficient is negative (although not significant at conventional levels), suggesting that 
these firms have weaker future performance. The coefficient in Column (2) is positive and 
significant, providing evidence that, within these firms, performance increases as the (negative) 
UPR increases (i.e., when UPR gets closer to zero because CEOs are underpaid less and/or 
employees are overpaid less). In other words, as compensation moves closer to the expected level 
based on economic determinants, performance increases. This result is consistent with the 
conjecture in section 5.3.2 that employees are at least partly aware of the economic factors that 
determine compensation and disparity, and provides evidence that performance benefits from 
fairer pay.36 
To further allay concerns that the relation between Ln UPR and performance is entirely 
driven by either excess CEO pay, as shown in Core etl al. (1999), or executive pay disparity, as 
shown in Bebchuk et al. (2011), in untabulated tests, I rerun my main regressions and include both 
excess CEO pay (calculated as CEO pay – explained CEO pay from Equation (2)) and the CEO 
pay slice (CEO total pay divided by the total pay of the top five executives) as controls. The 
coefficient on Ln UPR remains negative and significant when these controls are included.  
5.6 Summary 
																																								 																				
36 While the coefficients for Case 2 are both negative and marginally significant, it is difficult to interpret this result 
since UPR is negative for Case 2 firms. 
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The results in Section 5 suggest that pay disparity does impact firm performance, but that 
this effect is complex. When pay disparity (a high pay ratio) is the result of economic factors (Ln 
EPR), performance increases, which is consistent with Tournament Theory and is perhaps a better 
way to measure tournament incentives than examining raw pay disparity: Unlike raw 
compensation, which may include pay due to factors like rents and favoritism, explained 
compensation is more directly related to observable factors. Therefore, employees are more certain 
of the compensation that will come with increased effort (Lazear and Rosen 1981). When pay 
disparity is not justified by economic factors (Ln UPR), perhaps reflecting how rents are distributed 
between executives and employees, performance suffers (Akerlof and Yellen 1990). In Section 6, 
I further examine how the relation between Ln UPR and performance varies in the cross-section 
depending on firm characteristics. 
6. Interpreting the negative relation between unexplained pay disparity and performance 
6.1 Using corporate governance quality to identify ‘bad’ pay disparity 
 Section 5 documents a negative relation between unexplained pay disparity (Ln UPR) and 
firm performance. As noted above, one interpretation is that the unexplained portion of pay 
disparity reflects an unfair distribution of rents within the firm. If this is the case, I would expect 
a more pronounced negative relation between Ln UPR and performance when the quality of 
corporate governance is poor. Put differently, since there is measurement error in my estimate of 
Ln UPR, one may view the subset of firms with high Ln UPR and poor governance quality as 
capturing the portion of unexplained pay disparity more likely to reflect inequity in rents 
distribution, and, thus, more likely to negatively affect performance.  
In Table 10, I use two proxies for governance: Eindex, the Entrenchment Index of the 
CEO’s insulation from market discipline (Bebchuk et al. 2009), and InstOwn, the shares owned by 
institutional investors scaled by total shares outstanding, which an extensive literature has 
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identified as an effective monitoring proxy. In particular, in Column (1), I include two additional 
variables, High Eindex, which is equal to 1 if a firm’s Entrenchment Index is above the median, 
and 0 otherwise, and the interaction between Ln UPR and High Eindex. Consistent with my 
prediction, I find that the coefficient on the interaction term, -0.0036, is negative and significant. 
In Column (2), I include an indicator equal to 1 if InstOwn is less than the median, and 0 otherwise. 
The coefficient on interaction term at -0.0010 is negative as predicted, though not statistically 
significant at conventional levels (t statistic of -1.39).  Overall, these results are consistent with 
Prediction 3. 
6.2 How does unexplained pay disparity affect performance? The employee turnover channel  
 Having provided evidence that unexplained pay disparity has a negative effect on 
performance, it is natural to examine why this relation occurs (i.e., what is the channel through 
which Ln UPR affects performance?). Equity Theory suggests that employees will seek retribution 
for perceived underpayments by taking actions such as shirking or leaving the firm (Akerlof and 
Yellen 1990). I focus on one particular mechanism: employee turnover. Employees dissatisfied 
with perceived pay inequity are more likely to leave the firm. Replacing these employees is costly 
(search costs, training new employees, short-term decline in productivity) and may have a negative 
impact on performance. Table 11 tests how two proxies for employee satisfaction (Fortune and 
Just fair pay) and two proxies for turnover risk, Turnover and a measure of industry labor market 
tightness, impact the relation between Ln UPR and performance.  
In Column (1) of Panel A, I create an indicator, No Fortune, equal to 1 if a firm is not 
included on Fortune’s “100 Best Companies to Work” list. In Column (2), I create an indicator 
equal to 1 if a firm has a Just fair pay score below the median, where Just fair pay is defined as 
above. In both columns, the coefficient on the interaction between Ln UPR and the indicator for 
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low satisfaction is negative and significant at 1%, providing evidence that the negative relation 
between Ln UPR and performance is stronger when employees are dissatisfied, supporting 
prediction 4a. 
In Panel B, I examine whether this relation is also stronger when firms face greater labor 
market risks. In Column (1) I examine firm-level year-ahead Turnover, defined as above. I create 
an indicator, High Turn, equal to 1 if a firm’s Turnover is greater than the sample median, and 0 
otherwise. Consistent with Prediction 4b, the coefficient on the interaction between UPR and High 
Turn, -0.0023, is negative and significant at the 1% level, providing evidence for a potential 
channel through which greater UPR leads to weaker performance: increased future turnover. In 
Column (2), I examine Labor market tightness, a proxy for the mobility of workers, measured at 
the industry level. Specifically, using BLS’s Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) 
database, I calculate Labor market tightness as the industry-year rate of voluntary quits and job 
openings divided by the rate of layoffs and other separations. It is more likely that employees will 
quit in response to pay disparity (i.e., turnover risk is higher) when it is easier for them to get 
another job (Labor market tightness is higher). I construct an indicator, High LabMark, equal to 1 
if a firm is in an industry where Labor market tightness is greater than the median, and 0 otherwise. 
The coefficient on the interaction between UPR and High LabMark, -0.0036, is negative and 
significant at the 5% level suggesting that the negative relation between UPR and performance is 
more pronounced for firms in tighter labor markets (i.e., when employees have better outside 
options), consistent with Prediction 4c. 
7. Conclusion 
 The results in this paper describe a complex relation between firm-level pay disparity and 
firm performance. While there is no evidence of a statistically significant relation between 
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performance and disparity when disparity is broadly defined, narrowing the definition provides 
insights into how the structure of compensation within firms relates to firm performance. The 
components of compensation that are explained by economic factors create disparity that is 
positively related to firm performance, while disparity created by unexplained compensation is 
negatively related to performance, as well as to employee satisfaction. In addition, the negative 
relation between unexplained disparity and performance is driven largely by firms where the CEO 
is overpaid and employees are underpaid, providing evidence that this measure of unexplained 
disparity (UPR) is an effective proxy for pay fairness and that employees take into account the 
economic determinants of compensation when reacting to pay disparity. This negative relation also 
is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance, lower employee satisfaction, 
higher future turnover, and greater labor market risk. 
 That different types of pay disparity can have different effects on firms should be of interest 
to regulators and investors, given that the SEC will begin requiring firms to disclose the CEO pay 
ratio beginning in 2018. This paper lends credence to a concern of the pay ratio disclosure, that 
interpreting the ratio in a meaningful way will be challenging. As prior research and media reports 
suggest, financial statement users may focus on the raw ratios without putting them into economic 
context (Globalist 2013; Mas 2016). 
 This study benefits from access to detailed data that allow me to put the CEO pay ratio into 
context to provide a deep understanding of what drives disparity. These data are not available to 
most financial statement users. Therefore, the onus for preventing the misuse of pay ratios once 
they are disclosed falls to the firm. The final CEO pay ratio rule allows firms to provide 
explanations of how the ratio is created, and the results in this paper suggest that firms may be best 
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served by offering detailed information to investors about the economic justifications for their 
ratios. 
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Appendix 
  
Variable   Definition 
Establishment level   
Mean pay  Total yearly compensation/total yearly employment, measured at the end of the 
firm fiscal year 
Tot emp  Average yearly employment, measured at the end of the fiscal year 
Ch emp  Year-over-year percent change in Tot emp 
R&D emp pct  Percent of employees working in R&D jobs 
R&D indicator  Indicator equal to 1 if R&D emp pct is greater than 0 
Tech emp pct  Percent of employees working in technology jobs 
Tech indicator  Indicator equal to 1 if Tech emp pct is greater than 0 
Sales emp pct  Percent of employees working in non-retail sales jobs 
Sales indicator  Indicator equal to 1 if Sales emp pct is greater than 0 
Retail emp pct  Percent of employees working in retail jobs 
Retail indicator  Indicator equal to 1 if Retail emp pct is greater than 0 
Services emp pct  Percent of employees working in non-financial services jobs 
Services indicator  Indicator equal to 1 if Services emp pct is greater than 0 
Manufact emp pct  Percent of employees working in manufacturing jobs 
Manufact indicator  Indicator equal to 1 if Manufact emp pct is greater than 0 
Exec indicator  Indicator equal to 1 if top executives are working in the establishment 
Supervisor pct  Percent of employees with supervisory roles 
   
Macroeconomic level   
Ind-region comp  Average industry-level compensation for the nearest Metropolitan (or 
Micropolitan) Statistical Area, from the U.S. Census Bureau 
College grad  Percent of residents of nearest Metropolitan Statistical Area that hold a college 
degree, from the U.S. Census Bureau 
Right to work  Indicator equal to 1 if the establishment is located in a state that passed a "Right 
to Work" law for private firms 
   
Firm level   
Adj RNOA  (operating income *(1-tax rate))/((total assets - total cash) - (total liabilities - total 
debt)) - median two-digit SIC code RNOA, from Compustat 
Ln assets  The natural log of total assets, from Compustat 
BTM  Book value of equity/(share price * total shares outstanding), from Compustat 
Leverage  Total debt/total assets, from Compustat 
Labor productivity  Total sales/total employees, from Compustat 
Capital intensity  Capital expenditures/total sales, from Compustat 
Ln age  Natural log of (current year - first year firm appeared in CRSP) 
CEO pay  Total CEO compensation, from Execucomp 
R&D/sales  R&D expense/total sales, from Compustat 
RNOA Var  Rolling five-year standard deviation of Adj RNOA 
Ch rev  Year-over-year change in total revenue, from Compustat 
Adj ROA  Income before extraordinary items/total assets - median two-digit SIC code ROA, 
from Compustat 
Ret  Log(1 + continuously compounded monthly return during the fiscal year), from 
CRSP 
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Ret var  Rolling 60-month standard deviation of returns, from CRSP 
ROA var  Rolling five-year standard deviation of Adj ROA 
Ln CEO tenure  The natural log of the number of years the CEO has held that position, from 
Execucomp 
Ln CEO age  The natural log the CEO’s age, from Execucomp 
Outside CEO  An indicator equal to 1 if the CEO was hired from outside the firm, from 
Execucomp 
Loss  Indicator equal to 1 if net income is less than 0, from Compustat 
SPR  CEO Pay/Mean pay, from Execucomp and BLS 
EPR  Expected CEO compensation/expected mean compensation, where expected 
compensation is calculated using the empirical models in equations (1) and (2) 
UPR  SPR – EPR 
Emp pct  Total employees used to calculate mean compensation from QCEW/total 
employees reported in Compustat 
Fortune  An indicator equal to 1 if a firm was included in Fortune magazine’s “100 Best 
Places to Work” in a given year 
JUST fair pay  The average of four measures of fair pay as defined by JUST Capital. The four 
measures are based on whether the company pays a living wage, whether it 
discriminates in its compensation practices, whether compensation is fair 
compared to others doing the same job, and the gap between CEO compensation 
and non-executive compensation 
Turnover  Cancelled options at the end of year t+1/total outstanding options at the beginning 
of year t, from Compustat 
Labor market tightness  (Quit rate + job opening rate)/(layoff rate + other separations rate), measured at 
the industry level and calculated using the BLS JOLTS database 
Eindex  The Entrenchment Index, as defined by Bebchuk et al. (2009) 
InstOwn  Shares held by institutional investors/total shares outstanding, from Thomson 
Reuters Institutional Holdings database 
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Figure 1: Merging of financial, address, and establishment data 
 
 
 
 
Creating a firm-level database of BLS data is challenging given the lack of firm-level identifiers (Handwerker and 
Mason 2014). To overcome this challenge, I collected a list of subsidiary names from the SEC’s EDGAR website and 
merged it with financial data from Compustat, CRSP, and Execucomp. I then merged these data with Factual, a 
database of more than 20 million establishment addresses. Factual provides the common identifiers (name, address, 
geographic coordinates) to merge firm-level identifiers from the financial database with the BLS establishment 
database. 
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Table 1: Sample construction 
 
  Firm-years Establishment-years 
Financial dataset  12,607  
Factual +   ~20 million 
   550,828 
Hand check -   335,020 
  11,937 215,808 
QCEW merge  8,320 132,239 
Hand check -   81,663 
  6,134 120,576 
OES merge  5,208 104,478 
 
Table 1 reports how the sample used in this study changes with the introduction of each dataset, beginning with the 
full financial dataset from Compustat, CRSP, and Execucomp, and ending with the complete merge of all data from 
Factual, QCEW, and OES.  
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Table 2: The predicted relation between economic variables and establishment-level 
employee compensation 
  
  Variable 
Predicted 
sign Explanation 
Establishment 
factors 
 
Ch emp + A proxy for establishment profitability, which is not directly available 
from BLS. Establishments that increase employment do so as a reaction 
to prior positive performance and in anticipation of future positive 
performance (Merz and Yashiv 2007). 
 
 
R&D emp pct + A proxy for the need for human capital within the establishment. 
Knowledge workers have invested significant resources in education, 
possess valuable knowledge of the firm, and, particularly in industries 
where technological advancement are important, should command 
higher salaries. In addition, R&D intensity is closely related to 
uncertainty, so higher-level employees should be paid more and more 
equally (Siegel and Hambrick 2005). 
 
 
R&D indicator + A measure of the presence of knowledge workers, who are expected to 
have higher compensation as described above. 
 
 
Tech emp pct + Similar to R&D work, I expect this measure to be positively related to 
compensation since technology workers have specialized skills, and 
their output can be difficult to monitor. 
 
 
Tech indicator + A measure of the presence of technology workers, who are expected to 
have higher compensation as described above. 
 
 
Sales emp pct + Non-retail sales employees are more likely to have greater variation in 
their compensation with pay more closely tied to firm performance. 
When compensation is more variable, total compensation should be 
higher. In addition, sales employees are more likely to be white collar 
workers, demanding higher salaries. 
 
 
Sales indicator + A measure of the presence of non-retail sales workers, who are expected 
to have higher compensation as described above. 
 
 
Retail emp pct - Retail workers are often seasonal or temporary, are less likely to receive 
benefits, and are considered low skilled, leading to lower compensation. 
 
 
Retail indicator - A measure of the presence of retail workers, who are expected to have 
lower compensation as described above. 
 
 
Services emp pct - Much like the retail industry, non-financial services workers are often 
part-time and considered low skilled. 
 
 
Services indicator - A measure of the presence of non-financial service workers, who are 
expected to have lower compensation as described above. 
 
 
Manufact emp pct - The output of manufacturing workers is easily monitored, and the skills 
needed often require little education. In addition, these jobs are easily 
outsourced to low-wage countries, meaning that compensation for 
manufacturing workers faces downward pressure. 
 
 
Manufact indicator - A measure of the presence of manufacturing workers, who are expected 
to have lower compensation as described above. 
 
 
Exec indicator + Pay structure for executives is vastly different from that for lower-level 
employees. Firm headquarters, where most top executives are located, 
is also expected to have a high proportion of white-collar workers.  
 
 
Supervisor pct + A proxy for monitoring. Agency Theory predicts that there exists a 
tradeoff between monitoring and compensation, so a lower ratio may 
lead to higher compensation (Holmstrom 1979). In addition, 
Tournament Theory predicts that managers will make more than their 
subordinates (Lazear and Rosen 1981). 
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Macroeconomic 
factors 
 
Ind-region comp + Compensation levels are shaped by the labor market for employees, so 
the compensation at similar establishments in the same region should be 
positively related to establishment compensation. 
 
 
Col grad + A proxy for the skill level of the local population. A more highly 
educated population is likely to work in more highly-skilled professions. 
 
 
Right to work - “Right to Work” states have passed laws that have been shown to 
weaken union influence. Union representation has been shown to 
increase compensation and reduce inequality (e.g., Cowherd and Levine 
1992; Lemieux 2008). 
     
Firm 
characteristics 
 
Ln assets + Larger firms have greater resources to attract high-skilled workers, 
leading to a positive relation between compensation and firm size, and 
representing both the ability to pay and the firm’s employment needs. 
  Ln age +/- Younger firms are more likely to face capital constraints, limiting their 
ability to pay employees. Alternatively, because they are more risky and 
need to attract high-quality employees, they may be forced to pay more 
(Shin et al. 2015). 
 
 
R&D/sales + A proxy for the research intensity of the firm. Research-intensive firms 
are more dependent on human capital, and the market for research 
employees is likely competitive, meaning that the relation between 
research intensity and compensation should be positive. 
 
 
Adj RNOA + Adj RNOA is a measure of the operating profitability of the firm, and 
more profitable firms have the ability to pay more, thereby attracting 
highly skilled workers (e.g., Abowd et al. 1999).  
 
 
RNOA variance + A proxy for firm profitability risk. Profitability risk should influence 
compensation in two ways. First, it should be related to the structure of 
compensation since greater variability makes incentive compensation 
more risky to the employee and costly to the firm (Holmstrom 1979). 
Second, greater variance may increase the likelihood of layoffs, a risk 
that the firm is expected to share with its employees (Agrawal and Matsa 
2013). 
 
 
Labor productivity + Labor productivity may be a proxy for employee bargaining power in 
that labor-productive firms are more dependent on their employees, 
leading to higher compensation. 
 
 
Capital intensity +/- More capital intensive firms may be less reliant on employees, leading 
to decreases in compensation. Alternatively, capital intensive firms may 
need employees with specialized skills, leading to higher compensation. 
 
 
Leverage +/- Since interest payments directly impact a firm’s ability to make its 
payroll, higher leverage may be negatively associated with 
compensation. Alternatively, firms with higher leverage are at more risk 
of bankruptcy, potentially requiring risk payments to employees (Berk, 
Stanton, and Zechner 2010; Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang 2013). 
 
 
BTM - The book-to-market ratio is negatively correlated with profitability, and 
more profitable firms pay more (Abowd et al. 1999). In addition, growth 
opportunities lead firms to delegate more responsibility to lower-level 
employees and provide them with stronger incentives (Nagar 2002). 
 
 
Ch rev + Firms are likely to base performance pay on accounting numbers, and 
revenue represents income to the firm to be distributed among 
stakeholders (Murphy 2001). 
Table 2 describes the predicted relation between Mean pay, the mean establishment-level compensation, and 
establishment-, macroeconomic-, and firm-level variables expected to influence Mean pay. All variables are defined 
in the Appendix. 
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Table 3: Comparing the BLS sample and other Execucomp firms 
 
Panel A: Comparison of firm-level characteristics 
 
  Sample  Other Execucomp firms   
Variable n Mean   n Mean Difference 
Adj RNOA (%) 5,082 1.46  7,525 0.60 0.86*** 
Assets 5,082 15,424  7,525 13,490 1,934 
BTM 5,082 0.53  7,525 0.57 -0.04*** 
Leverage 5,082 0.68  7,525 0.83 -0.15*** 
Labor productivity 5,082 441.8  7,525 525.6 -83.80*** 
Capital intensity 5,082 48.59  7,525 59.32 -10.73*** 
Age 5,082 29.46  7,525 24.13 5.33*** 
CEO pay 5,082 5,814.3  7,525 4,893.3 921*** 
RNOA var 5,082 0.17  7,525 0.30 -0.13*** 
R&D/sales 5,082 0.03  7,525 0.03 0.00*** 
Ch rev 5,082 0.08  7,525 0.08 0.00 
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Panel B: Industry composition  
 
Industry % of sample % of other Execucomp firms 
Food 3.77% 2.80% 
Mining and minerals 1.28% 0.97% 
Oil and petroleum products 3.87% 4.16% 
Textiles, apparel, and footwear 2.11% 1.73% 
Consumer durables 1.58% 2.07% 
Chemicals 3.32% 1.95% 
Consumer goods 3.22% 4.16% 
Construction and materials 3.81% 3.26% 
Steel works 1.22% 1.40% 
Fabricated products 0.97% 0.78% 
Machinery and business equipment 20.92% 11.37% 
Automobiles 1.34% 1.90% 
Transportation 4.68% 4.11% 
Utilities 2.98% 5.82% 
Retail stores 7.76% 6.59% 
Financials 7.34% 18.35% 
Other 29.82% 28.58% 
 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the firm-year observations in my sample and the firm-years observations for 
the other firms in Execucomp for the 2006-2013 period. Panel A compares the mean values of the firm-level 
characteristics used in this study, with the differences between the two samples reported in the last column. *** 
indicates statistically significant differences at the 1% confidence level. Panel B reports the percent of firms in each 
industry, where industry is defined as Fama-French 17 industry portfolios. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
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Table 4: Establishment-year descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
 Variable   N Mean 
Standard 
deviation Q1 Median Q3 
Establishment 
variables Mean pay (000s)  104,748 42.07 40.17 15.38 27.16 54.14 
 Tot emp  104,748 80.38 156.53 11.67 25.58 76.58 
 Ch emp  104,748 -0.0021 0.1823 -0.0758 -0.0064 0.0562 
 R&D emp pct  104,748 0.0184 0.0724 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 R&D indicator  104,748 0.1484 0.3555 0 0 0 
 Tech emp pct  104,748 0.0265 0.1032 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 Tech indicator  104,748 0.1726 0.3779 0 0 0 
 Sales emp pct  104,748 0.0614 0.1602 0.0000 0.0000 0.0270 
 Sales indicator  104,748 0.3769 0.4846 0 0 1 
 Retail emp pct  104,748 0.2288 0.3495 0.0000 0.0000 0.3827 
 Retail indicator  104,748 0.4668 0.4989 0 0 1 
 Services emp pct  104,748 0.2051 0.3651 0.0000 0.0000 0.1502 
 Services indicator  104,748 0.4040 0.4907 0 0 1 
 Manufact emp pct  104,748 0.0448 0.1431 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 Manufact indicator  104,748 0.1916 0.3935 0 0 0 
 Exec indicator  104,748 0.0437 0.0963 0 0 0 
 Supervisor pct  104,748 0.1343 0.1066 0.0635 0.1176 0.1796 
Macroeconomic 
variables Ind-region comp (000s)  104,748 36.37 19.59 20.41 35.61 44.38 
 College grad %  104,748 0.2569 0.0763 0.2081 0.2511 0.2990 
 Right to work (indicator)  104,748 0.4702 0.4991 0 0 1 
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Panel B: Industry composition of establishments 
 
Industry % of sample 
Food 1.37% 
Mining and minerals 0.69% 
Oil and petroleum products 1.23% 
Textiles, apparel, and footwear 0.74% 
Consumer durables 0.32% 
Chemicals 1.27% 
Consumer goods 0.64% 
Construction and materials 2.23% 
Steel works 0.22% 
Fabricated products 0.46% 
Machinery and business equipment 4.52% 
Automobiles 1.35% 
Transportation 2.97% 
Utilities 1.14% 
Retail stores 42.77% 
Financials 13.65% 
Other 24.43% 
 
 
Panel C: Mean pay by establishment type 
  Mean pay (in 000s)   
Variable   var = 1 var = 0   Difference 
R&D indicator  85.45 34.52  50.93*** 
Tech indicator  83.01 33.54  49.47*** 
Sales indicator  58.80 31.96  26.84*** 
Retail indicator  32.34 50.60  -18.26*** 
Services indicator  26.12 52.89  -26.77*** 
Manufact indicator  48.89 40.46  8.43*** 
Exec indicator  74.85 41.77  33.08*** 
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Panel D: Correlation matrix 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1. Mean pay -0.00 0.47* 0.46* 0.49* 0.48* 0.45* 0.41* -0.33* -0.22* -0.41* -0.49* 0.21* 0.19*
2. Ch emp 0.00 -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.02* -0.02* 0.01* 0.01* 0.02* 0.03* -0.01* -0.01*
3. R&D emp pct 0.38* -0.01 0.70* 0.57* 0.57* 0.19* 0.22* -0.24* -0.17* -0.11* -0.18* 0.34* 0.31*
4. R&D indicator 0.45* -0.03* 0.61* 0.57* 0.58* 0.19* 0.23* -0.23* -0.16* -0.10* -0.17* 0.34* 0.31*
5. Tech emp pct 0.39* -0.01* 0.15* 0.29* 0.99* 0.26* 0.29* -0.21* -0.13* -0.12* -0.19* 0.14* 0.13*
6. Tech indicator 0.47* -0.02* 0.32* 0.58* 0.56* 0.26* 0.29* -0.21* -0.12* -0.12* -0.19* 0.17* 0.16*
7. Sales emp pct 0.33* 0.01* -0.02* 0.01* 0.02* 0.04* 0.96* -0.02* 0.13* -0.18* -0.26* 0.10* 0.12*
8. Sales indicator 0.32* -0.02* 0.08* 0.23* 0.15* 0.29* 0.49* 0.01* 0.16* -0.10* -0.20* 0.19* 0.21*
9. Retail emp pct -0.35* 0.00 -0.16* -0.26* -0.16* -0.25* -0.17* -0.18* 0.94* -0.11* -0.18* -0.04* -0.01*
10. Retail indicator -0.23* 0.01* -0.16* -0.16* -0.11* -0.13* 0.02* 0.15* 0.70* -0.04* -0.13* 0.02* 0.05*
11. Services emp pct -0.33* 0.00 -0.11* -0.10* -0.13* -0.11* -0.25* -0.09* -0.19* -0.05* 0.95* 0.14* 0.16*
12. Services indicator -0.35* 0.02* -0.14* -0.22* -0.14* -0.24* -0.20* -0.35* -0.28* -0.29* 0.68* 0.02* 0.04*
13. Manufact emp pct 0.12* -0.02* 0.12* 0.38* -0.05* 0.18* -0.08* 0.06* -0.18* -0.15* -0.02* -0.16* 0.99*
14. Manufact indicator 0.08* -0.02* 0.15* 0.32* -0.04* 0.16* -0.11* 0.21* -0.12* 0.06* 0.17* -0.19* 0.64*
15. Exec indicator 0.08* -0.00 0.02* 0.04* 0.01* 0.03* 0.01* 0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* 0.00* 0.01*
16. Supervisor pct 0.11* 0.00 -0.02* -0.00 -0.03* 0.00 0.01* 0.07* 0.13* 0.11* -0.20* -0.14* -0.06* -0.08*
17. Ind-region comp 0.50* -0.02* 0.23* 0.30* 0.29* 0.35* 0.21* 0.21* -0.36* -0.25* -0.21* -0.12* 0.06* -0.02*
18. College grad 0.01* 0.00 0.03* 0.05* 0.07* 0.05* -0.00 -0.00 -0.02* -0.01* 0.01* 0.00* 0.03* 0.03*
19. Right to work -0.02* 0.00 -0.03* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* 0.00 -0.03* 0.01* 0.01* -0.01* -0.01 -0.00 -0.03*
20. Ln assets 0.21* -0.02* 0.03* 0.06* 0.07* 0.12* 0.12* 0.20* -0.26* -0.11* -0.09* -0.14* -0.06* -0.02*
21. Ln age 0.17* -0.01* 0.11* 0.15* 0.07* 0.11* 0.09* 0.13* -0.13* -0.03* -0.14* -0.18* 0.14* 0.19*
22. R&D/sales 0.42* 0.01* 0.35* 0.35* 0.39* 0.35* 0.17* 0.17* -0.17* -0.11* -0.13* -0.14* 0.13* 0.10*
23. Adj RNOA 0.00 0.02* 0.05* 0.01* 0.04* 0.00 -0.03* -0.12* -0.02* -0.07* 0.07* -0.14* -0.02* -0.05*
24. RNOA variance 0.09* 0.01* 0.04* 0.04* 0.10* 0.08* 0.05* 0.03* 0.03* 0.02* -0.06* -0.07* -0.01* -0.01*
25. Labor productivity 0.37* -0.00 0.20* 0.22* 0.09* -0.17* 0.14* 0.15* -0.08* -0.03* -0.22* -0.28* 0.11* 0.13*
26. Capital intensity -0.02* -0.02* 0.01* 0.04* 0.01* 0.04* 0.02* 0.11* 0.00 0.03* -0.08* -0.22* 0.07* 0.10*
27. Leverage 0.03* -0.02* -0.03* -0.01* -0.03* 0.00 0.03* 0.03* -0.17* -0.10* 0.01* 0.05* -0.02* -0.03*
28. BTM 0.06* -0.06* -0.01* 0.04* -0.01* 0.06* 0.09* 0.14* 0.02* 0.01* -0.23* -0.29* 0.03* 0.01*
29. Ch rev 0.04* 0.06* 0.00 -0.00 0.01* 0.01* 0.04* 0.02* -0.02* -0.01* -0.03* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01
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Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of establishment-level variables. Panel A reports general descriptive statistics. Panel B reports the percent of 
establishments in each industry, where industry is defined as Fama-French 17 industry portfolios. Panel C compares the mean compensation across establishments 
with different workforce composition, i.e., depending on whether a certain type of employees (e.g., R&D) are present in the establishment (see indicator variable 
listed on the left). Differences between mean compensations are reported in the final column. *** indicates significance at the 1% confidence level. Panel D reports 
Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal, with * indicating significance at the 5% confidence level. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
1. Mean pay 0.07* 0.03* 0.54* -0.04* -0.02* 0.17* 0.19* 0.41* 0.00 0.03* 0.67* 0.08* 0.07* 0.21* 0.02*
2. Ch emp 0.00 0.01* -0.01* 0.00 0.01* -0.03* -0.00 -0.03* 0.04* 0.02* -0.03* -0.04* -0.03* -0.08* 0.11*
3. R&D emp pct 0.03* -0.00 0.28* 0.04* -0.02* 0.08* 0.17* 0.43* 0.01* 0.08* 0.32* 0.00 -0.00 0.07* 0.00
4. R&D indicator 0.03* -0.01 0.28* 0.04* -0.02* 0.08* 0.17* 0.42* -0.00 0.08* 0.32* 0.01* -0.00 0.08* 0.00
5. Tech emp pct 0.03* -0.01 0.33* 0.04* -0.02* 0.13* 0.11 0.40* -0.01 0.09* 0.31* 0.05* -0.01* 0.08* 0.00
6. Tech indicator 0.03* -0.01* 0.33* 0.04* -0.01* 0.13* 0.11* 0.39* -0.01* 0.08* 0.31* 0.05* -0.00 0.09* 0.00
7. Sales emp pct 0.02* 0.10* 0.28* -0.01* -0.02* 0.09* 0.09* 0.17* -0.15* 0.03* 0.36* 0.12* 0.01* 0.16* 0.01*
8. Sales indicator 0.02* 0.09* 0.22* -0.00* -0.02* 0.12* 0.10* 0.14* -0.16* 0.01* 0.34* 0.13* 0.03* 0.17* 0.00
9. Retail emp pct -0.03* 0.18* -0.38* -0.01* 0.01* -0.15* -0.06* -0.34* -0.00 -0.06* -0.00 0.21* -0.26* 0.11* 0.01*
10. Retail indicator -0.02* 0.16* -0.29* -0.01 0.01* -0.08* -0.02* -0.29* -0.04* 0.04* 0.06* 0.19* -0.19* 0.10* 0.02*
11. Services emp pct -0.03* -0.17* -0.23* 0.01* -0.01* 0.07* -0.10* -0.15* 0.07* -0.09* -0.39* -0.14* 0.19* -0.25* 0.01*
12. Services indicator -0.03* -0.18* -0.22* 0.01* -0.01* 0.04* -0.13* -0.14* 0.13* -0.09* -0.50* -0.23* 0.20* -0.32* 0.01*
13. Manufact emp pct 0.01* -0.08* -0.01* 0.03* -0.02* 0.06* 0.23* 0.17* -0.09* -0.01* 0.25* 0.08* 0.06* 0.11* 0.01*
14. Manufact indicator 0.01* -0.07* -0.03* 0.03* -0.03* 0.08* 0.23* 0.14* -0.10* -0.02* 0.25* 0.08* 0.07* 0.11* 0.04*
15. Exec indicator 0.08* 0.02* 0.001 0.01* -0.02* 0.00 0.02* -0.00 -0.01* 0.03* -0.00 -0.01* 0.01* 0.04*
16. Supervisor pct 0.12* 0.07* -0.06* 0.05* -0.08* -0.02* -0.01* 0.05* -0.08* 0.08* -0.02* -0.06* -0.00 0.01*
17. Ind-region comp 0.03* 0.06* -0.00 -0.06* 0.18* 0.07* 0.35* -0.10* 0.00 0.41* -0.04* 0.14* 0.03* 0.05*
18. College grad 0.01* -0.06* -0.02* -0.06* -0.05* 0.06* 0.02* 0.01* 0.03* -0.03* 0.04* -0.01 -0.01* 0.11*
19. Right to work 0.01* 0.06* -0.05* -0.07* -0.03* 0.04* -0.04* 0.02* -0.01* -0.02* 0.03* 0.01* -0.02* 0.03*
20. Ln assets -0.03* -0.04* 0.23* -0.06* -0.04* 0.38* 0.14* -0.03* -0.07* 0.43* -0.22* 0.42* -0.01* 0.01*
21. Ln age -0.00 0.00 0.08* 0.03* 0.04* 0.41* 0.11* 0.01* 0.07* 0.28* -0.02* 0.15* 0.03* -0.07*
22. R&D/sales 0.01* -0.00 0.27* 0.05* -0.02* -0.07* 0.04* 0.27* 0.15* 0.23* -0.14* 0.06* -0.22* 0.03*
23. Adj RNOA -0.00 -0.01 -0.04* 0.01* 0.02* -0.06* -0.04* 0.11* 0.10* -0.21* -0.19* -0.15* -0.60* 0.15*
24. RNOA variance -0.00 0.01* 0.06* 0.02* 0.00 -0.12* -0.06* 0.24* 0.05* -0.02* -0.17* -0.08* -0.11* -0.07*
25. Labor productivity 0.03* 0.07* 0.33* -0.01* 0.01* 0.31* 0.20* 0.07* -0.06* 0.01* 0.06* 0.12* 0.24* 0.05*
26. Capital intensity -0.00 -0.07* -0.01* 0.03* 0.00 -0.16* -0.00 -0.05* -0.21* 0.04* -0.00 -0.13* 0.26* -0.09*
27. Leverage -0.01* -0.01* 0.11* -0.02* 0.03* 0.24* 0.12* -0.06* -0.07* -0.04* 0.03* -0.01* -0.07* -0.08*
28. BTM -0.00 0.01 0.07* -0.01* 0.01* 0.15* 0.06* -0.11* -0.26* -0.04* 0.13* 0.27* 0.07* -0.23*
29. Ch rev 0.01* 0.04* 0.06* 0.01* -0.00 0.01* -0.05* 0.02* 0.07* 0.01* 0.05* -0.07* 0.15* -0.12*
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Table 5: Modeling explained compensation 
 
Panel A: Establishment-level employee compensation model 
   Mean pay 
Variable   predicted sign (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ch emp  + 3.180** 3.620*** 2.736** 3.056*** 
   (2.25) (2.98) (2.26) (3.06) 
R&D emp pct  + 94.389*** 86.841*** 61.257*** 53.356*** 
   (7.97) (8.48) (9.14) (7.00) 
R&D indicator  + 11.280*** 9.952*** 9.006*** 7.046*** 
   (6.62) (6.38) (6.17) (5.21) 
Tech emp pct  + 71.865*** 63.491*** 48.663*** 48.445*** 
   (8.15) (7.58) (7.14) (8.33) 
Tech indicator  + 11.500*** 9.127*** 8.806*** 8.450*** 
   (6.54) (5.57) (5.73) (6.54) 
Sales emp pct  + 54.229*** 50.845*** 42.635*** 38.748*** 
   (7.51) (7.17) (5.89) (4.95) 
Sales indicator  + -1.090 -1.817 -0.805 -1.099 
   (-0.68) (-1.19) (-0.53) (-0.81) 
Retail emp pct  - -29.989*** -23.245*** -24.050*** -23.838*** 
   (-11.59) (-8.86) (-9.30) (-6.79) 
Retail indicator  - -4.609*** -4.626*** -4.654*** -3.7438** 
   (-2.78) (-3.04) (-3.12) (-2.50) 
Services emp pct  - -26.946*** -27.099*** -27.684*** -16.690*** 
   (-7.59) (-8.32) (-8.37) (-4.53) 
Services indicator  - -5.760*** -3.018** -2.063 -1.684 
   (-3.22) (-2.00) (-1.39) (-1.36) 
Manufact emp pct  - -2.308 -3.155 -5.806 -11.852*** 
   (-0.52) (-0.81) (-1.57) (-3.01) 
Manufact indicator  - -0.972 0.651 -1.348 -2.594* 
   (-0.54) (0.41) (-0.89) (-1.82) 
Exec indicator  + 13.616*** 13.458*** 13.442*** 13.307*** 
   (3.71) (3.66) (3.82) (3.86) 
Supervisor pct  + 40.645*** 36.220*** 30.772*** 33.067*** 
   (5.36) (5.85) (5.64) (6.79) 
Ind-region comp  +  0.384*** 0.288*** 0.266*** 
    (9.30) (8.65) (9.67) 
College grad  +/-  -0.030 -0.034 -0.023 
    (-0.71) (-0.89) (-0.73) 
Right to work  -  -0.670 -0.987* -0.956** 
    (-0.99) (-1.75) (-2.05) 
Ln assets  +   0.246*** 0.306*** 
     (4.23) (4.12) 
Ln age  -   -0.450*** -0.577*** 
     (-3.17) (-3.79) 
R&D/sales  +   228.168*** 199.097*** 
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     (7.52) (6.67) 
Adj RNOA  +   1.867*** 2.615*** 
     (2.98) (4.12) 
RNOA Var  +   1.488*** 1.133*** 
     (4.71) (3.59) 
Labor productivity  +   0.016*** 0.012*** 
     (5.86) (3.27) 
Capital intensity  +/-   -0.049*** -0.0487*** 
     (-5.49) (-4.41) 
Leverage  +/-   -0.052 -0.047 
     (-0.21) (-0.22) 
BTM  -   -2.988* -2.921** 
     (-1.75) (-2.14) 
Ch rev  +   -3.796 1.067 
     (-1.37) (0.49) 
       
Year fixed effects     No No No Yes 
Industry fixed effects   No No No Yes 
Observations   104,748 104,748 104,748 104,748 
Firms   931 931 931 931 
Adj. R2     52.5% 55.0% 58.1% 61.1% 
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Panel B: CEO compensation model 
 
Variable   
predicted 
sign CEO pay 
ROA  + 3,953.82*** 
   (4.66) 
ROA var  + 5,916.10*** 
   (5.14) 
Rett  + 166.021 
   (1.09) 
Ret var  + 5,916.10*** 
   (5.14) 
Rett-1  + 639.009*** 
   (4.45) 
Ln CEO tenure  + 352.363*** 
   (6.03) 
Ln CEO age  + -766.349* 
   (-1.74) 
Outside CEO  + 318.595*** 
   (2.90) 
Loss  - -15.754 
   (-0.08) 
Ln assets  + 2,413.50*** 
   (64.91) 
BTM  - 1,638.02*** 
   (9.96) 
Leverage  +/- -22.267 
   (-0.63) 
    
Year fixed effects     Yes 
Industry fixed effects   Yes 
Observations   5,082 
Firms   931 
Adj. R2     56.3% 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the regression models used to measure explained employee and CEO compensation. 
Panel A reports the results of regressing the establishment, macroeconomic, and firm variables on mean establishment-
level employee compensation. Firm-level variables are measured in period t-1 to better capture their impact on 
employee compensation, which is measured when it is paid, not when it is earned. Panel B reports the results of 
regressing firm-level variables on CEO total compensation (CEO pay). All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t statistics 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Pay ratios and firm-level descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Pay ratios and firm-level characteristics: descriptive statistics 
Variable   N Mean 
Standard 
deviation Q1 Median Q3 
SPR  5,082 101.55 135.95 24.67 55.11 123.36 
EPR  5,082 72.72 131.19 18.01 55.73 108.57 
UPR  5,082 23.29 138.36 -18.76 7.040 38.88 
Adj RNOA  5,082 0.015 0.22 -0.018 0.011 0.056 
Assets  5,082 15,424.15 98,724.17 905.88 2,771.52 8,224.29 
BTM  5,082 0.526 0.364 0.287 0.452 0.684 
Leverage  5,082 0.678 1.447 0.119 0.439 0.887 
Labor productivity 5,082 441.76 512.28 197.57 293.63 476.3 
Capital intensity  5,082 48.59 52.714 15.87 30.092 51.34 
Age  5,082 29.46 19.53 15 23 39 
CEO pay  5,082 5,814.28 5,131.14 2,051.48 4,206.10 7,700.07 
Emp pct  5,082 0.4432 0.9770 0.1402 0.3141 0.5739 
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Panel B: Correlation matrix 
 
 
 
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics for the pay ratios and the other firm-level variables of interest. SPR (Simple Pay Ratio) is calculated as CEO 
compensation/mean employee compensation at the firm-level. EPR (Economic Pay Ratio) is calculated as CEO explained compensation/mean employee 
explained compensation, where explained compensation is calculated using Equation (1) for mean employee compensation and Equation (2) for CEO 
compensation. UPR (Unexplained Pay Ratio) is equal to SPR – EPR. Panel A reports general descriptive statistics. Panel B reports Pearson (Spearman) 
correlations below (above) the diagonal, with * indicating significance at the 5% confidence level. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
SPR EPR UPR Mean comp CEO pay Ln assets Adj RNOA BHAR BTM Leverage Labor productivity Capital intensity Ln age
SPR 0.5053* 0.4458* -0.5305* 0.77318 0.4993* 0.0998* -0.0093 -0.1508* 0.1768* -0.1093* -0.0048 0.2449*
EPR 0.6579* -0.2432* -0.1657* 0.4864* 0.4235* 0.0459* 0.0263 0.1299* -0.2457* 0.0700* 0.0451* -0.1983*
UPR 0.5335* -0.2603* -0.3087* 0.0976* 0.0448* -0.0304* -0.0324* 0.0000 0.1971* 0.0737* -0.1075* 0.0277*
Mean comp -0.3355* -0.1090* -0.1809* 0.0629* 0.0386* 0.0794* -0.0171 -0.0594* -0.0244 0.4469* -0.1066* -0.0213
CEO pay 0.6255* 0.2604* 0.0568* 0.0466* 0.6615* 0.1705* -0.0242 0.2178* 0.2180* 0.2013* -0.0928* 0.2917*
Ln assets 0.3448* 0.1847* 0.0340* 0.0960* 0.6325* 0.0536* 0.0139 0.0259 0.4201* 0.3220* -0.1693* 0.3835*
Adj RNOA 0.0522* 0.0785* -0.0896* -0.0874* 0.0930* 0.0345* -0.0834* -0.3883* -0.1843* 0.0276* 0.0205 0.0267
BHAR 0.0237 0.0262 -0.0318* -0.0155 0.0102 0.0187 -0.0327* 0.0650* 0.0080 -0.0351* 0.0123 0.0065
BTM -0.1331* 0.0086 0.0096 0.0088 0.1805* 0.0666* -0.2003* 0.0174 0.0388* 0.0145 0.0556* 0.0075
Leverage 0.0923* -0.0960* 0.0817* 0.0833* 0.0823* 0.2014* -0.0461* -0.0043 0.005 0.1518* -0.1588* 0.1812*
Labor productivity -0.0356* -0.0338* 0.0491* 0.2698* 0.1799* 0.1799* 0.2573* -0.0378* 0.0731* 0.0172 -0.0750* 0.0965*
Capital intensity -0.0247 0.0357* -0.0355* -0.0705* -0.0705* -0.0636* -0.0929* 0.0006 0.1118* -0.0544* 0.1235* -0.0176
Ln age 0.1374* -0.0865* 0.0438* -0.0439* -0.0439* 0.2981* 0.3915* 0.0167 -0.0177 0.0639* 0.0454* -0.0666*
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Table 7: Validating Ln UPR (Unexplained Pay Ratio): association with proxies for 
employee satisfaction 
  Fortune JUST fair pay Turnover 
Variable   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln UPR  -0.0109* -0.0115* -0.0363* -0.0399* 0.0003 0.0004* 
  (-1.74) (-1.76) (-1.79) (-1.69) (1.60) (1.67) 
Adj ROA   2.7187***  4.3060**  -0.1603*** 
   (4.07)  (2.05)  (-6.59) 
Ln assets   0.6392***  -0.8695***  -0.0046 
   (10.48)  (-6.27)  (-0.77) 
BTM   -2.4853***  -0.1742  0.0668*** 
   (-6.54)  (-0.31)  (9.32) 
Leverage   -0.1161**  -0.0861  0.0013 
   (-2.53)  (-0.78)  (1.03) 
Labor productivity   -0.0035  0.1926***  -0.0025** 
   (-0.19)  (4.68)  (-2.25) 
Capital intensity   -1.6833***  0.2640  -0.0033 
   (-4.11)  (0.71)  (-0.55) 
Ln age   -0.7758***  -0.4941*  0.0126 
   (-5.55)  (-1.88)  (0.57) 
        
Year fixed effects   No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No 
Firm fixed effects  No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations  5,082 5,082 2,335 2,335 4,921 4,921 
Firms  931 931 375 375 918 918 
Obs, Fortune = 1  361 361     
Adj. R2   0.99% 17.9% 10.1% 13.6% 35.3% 37.9% 
 
Table 7 reports the results of regressing firm-level measures of employee satisfaction on the natural log of the 
Unexplained Pay Ratio (Ln UPR) and control variables. UPR is equal to the Unexplained Pay Ratio as defined above. 
The dependent variable in Columns (1)-(2) is Fortune, an indicator equal to 1 if a firm was listed in Fortune’s “100 
Best Places to Work” list in that year. The dependent variable in Columns (3)-(4) is Just fair pay, the firm-level 
average of four variables related to employee compensation (fair pay, pay discrimination, paying a living wage, and 
non-executive pay compared to CEO pay), calculated by the not-for-profit organization JUST Capital using several 
data sources. The dependent variable in Columns (5)-(6) is Turnover, equal to the number of cancelled options in year 
t+1 divided by the number of outstanding options in year t, as defined by Carter and Lynch (2004). All variables are 
defined in the Appendix. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. t statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 8: Pay ratios and firm performance 
Panel A: The pay ratios and year-ahead operating performance 
  Adj RNOAt+1 
Variable   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ln SPR  0.0011    0.0006    
  (1.44)    (0.78)    
Ln EPR   0.0009***  0.0014**  0.0010***  0.0018** 
   (2.73)  (2.18)  (2.96)  (2.23) 
Ln UPR    -0.0013** -0.0009   -0.0013** -0.0013* 
    (-2.43) (-1.56)   (-2.54) (-1.75) 
Adj RNOAt      -0.0250 -0.0263 -0.0262 -0.0260 
      (-1.41) (-1.49) (-1.49) (-1.47) 
Ln assets      -0.0716*** -0.0695*** -0.0700*** -0.0693*** 
      (-5.37) (-5.23) (-5.27) (-5.22) 
BTM      -0.1776*** -0.1807*** -0.1798*** -0.1812*** 
      (-11.07) (-11.31) (-11.26) (-11.33) 
Leverage      0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
      (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Labor productivity     0.0036* 0.0036* 0.0036* 0.0037* 
      (1.68) (1.68) (1.67) (1.70) 
Capital intensity      0.0052 0.0048 0.0051 0.0046 
      (0.39) (0.36) (0.38) (0.35) 
Ln age      0.0156 0.0187 0.0180 0.0191 
      (0.33) (0.40) (0.38) (0.41) 
          
Year fixed effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  5,082 5,082 5,082 5,082 5,082 5,082 5,082 5,082 
Firms  931 931 931 931 931 931 931 931 
Adj. R2   28.5% 28.6% 28.6% 28.7% 31.5% 31.7% 31.6% 31.8% 
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Panel B: Industry-adjusted pay ratios and year-ahead operating performance 
  Adj RNOAt+1 
Variable   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Industry-adjusted Ln SPR  -0.0039    
  (-0.57)    
Industry-adjusted Ln EPR   0.0011***  0.0022** 
   (3.35)  (2.07) 
Industry-adjusted Ln UPR    -0.0015*** -0.0017** 
    (-2.84) (-2.44) 
Adj RNOAt  -0.0240 -0.0265 -0.0264 -0.0261 
  (-1.36) (-1.50) (-1.49) (-1.48) 
Ln assets  -0.0704*** -0.0694*** -0.0699*** -0.0691*** 
  (-5.28) (-5.22) (-5.26) (-5.20) 
BTM  -0.1797*** -0.1813*** -0.1802*** -0.1820*** 
  (-11.20) (-11.35) (-11.28) (-11.38) 
Leverage  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) 
Labor productivity  0.0038* 0.0036* 0.0036* 0.0036* 
  (1.75) (1.68) (1.67) (1.70) 
Capital intensity  0.0050 0.0048 0.0050 0.0047 
  (0.38) (0.36) (0.38) (0.35) 
Ln age  0.0171 0.0193 0.0183 0.0197 
  (0.36) (0.41) (0.39) (0.42) 
      
Year fixed effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  5,082 5,082 5,082 5,082 
Firms  931 931 931 931 
Adj. R2   31.5% 31.7% 31.7% 31.8% 
 
Table 8 reports an analysis of the relation between firm performance and pay ratios. In all panels, performance is 
measured as Adj RNOAt+1. Ln SPR, Ln EPR, and Ln UPR are equal to the natural logs of the pay ratios as defined 
above. Panel A examines the relation between Adj RNOA and the pay ratios. Panel B reports the results of the relation 
between Adj RNOA and industry-adjusted pay ratios, where the adjusted ratios are equal to the ratio – the median 
industry-year ratio (industry is defined by two-digit SIC code). All variables are defined in the Appendix. Continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t statistics are reported 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 9: Examining the relation between the numerator and denominator of the 
unexplained pay ratio 
 
Panel A: How Excess CEO pay and Excess mean pay create the UPR 
Case 		
Sign of Excess 
CEO pay 
Sign of Excess 
mean pay 
Sign of 
UPR 
Case 1  - - + 
     
Case 2  - - - 
     
Case 3  + - + 
     
Case 4  - + - 
     
Case 5  + + - 
     
Case 6  + + + 
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Panel B: The relation between different types of UPR and performance 
   Adj RNOAt+1 
Variable   Case indicator Case indicator * Ln UPR 
		 		 N (1) (2) 
Case 1  829 -0.0220 -0.0015 
   (-0.88) (-1.27) 
Case 2  811 -0.0423* -0.0038* 
   (-1.71) (-1.92) 
Case 3  1,212 -0.0506** -0.0049*** 
   (-2.08) (-3.52) 
Case 4  1,032 -0.0323 0.0048** 
   (-1.36) (2.04) 
Case 5  501 -0.0428 -0.0038 
   (-1.63) (-1.38) 
Case 6  697 0.0060 -0.0000 
   (1.29) (-0.05) 
Adj RNOAt   -0.0242 -0.0290 
   (-1.37) (-1.65) 
Ln assets   -0.0725*** -0.0671*** 
   (-5.41) (-5.05) 
BTM   -0.1783*** -0.1824*** 
   (-11.07) (-11.43) 
Leverage   0.0000 0.0000 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
Labor productivity   0.0040* 0.0039* 
   (1.86) (1.77) 
Capital intensity   0.0043 0.0023 
   (0.33) (0.18) 
Ln age   0.0176 0.0112 
   (0.37) (0.24) 
     
Year fixed effects     Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects   Yes Yes 
Observations   5,082 5,082 
Number of firms   931 931 
Adj. R2     31.6% 32.0% 
 
Table 9 reports the results of regressions of the pay-performance relation based on the differing compensations of the 
CEO and the mean employee. Performance is measured as Adj RNOAt+1. Ln UPR is equal to the natural log of the 
Unexplained Pay Ratio as defined above. Panel A explains how the signs of Excess CEO pay and Excess mean pay 
create the sign of UPR. Excess CEO pay is total CEO pay – explained CEO pay, where explained pay is calculated in 
Equation (2). Excess mean pay is total Mean pay – explained mean pay, where explained pay is calculated in Equation 
(1). Panel B examines the relation between each case from Panel A and Adj RNOAt+1. Column (1) regresses an 
indicator for each case on performance. The independent variables of interest in Column (2) are interactions between 
the case indicators and Ln UPR. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% 
and 99%. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 10: The impact of corporate governance on the Ln UPR-performance relation 
  Adj RNOAt+1 
Variable   (1) (2) 
Ln UPR  -0.0017*** -0.0009 
  (-2.85) (-1.30) 
High Eindex  0.0084  
  (0.54)  
Ln UPR * High Eindex  -0.0036***  
  (-3.32)  
Low InstOwn   -0.0117 
   (-1.06) 
UPR * Low InstOwn   -0.0010 
   (-1.39) 
Adj RNOAt  -0.0901*** -0.0211 
  (-4.43) (-1.18) 
Ln assets  -0.1446*** -0.0744*** 
  (-8.14) (-5.23) 
BTM  -0.1741*** -0.1773*** 
  (-8.94) (-10.83) 
Leverage  0.0006 0.0004 
  (0.16) (0.13) 
Labor productivity  0.0031 0.0039* 
  (1.36) (1.86) 
Capital intensity  0.0115 0.0108 
  (0.78) (0.83) 
Ln age  0.1583** 0.0008 
  (2.55) (0.02) 
    
Year fixed effects   Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects  Yes Yes 
Observations  3,754 4,820 
Number of firms  792 904 
Adj. R2   29.0% 31.6% 
 
Table 10 examines how the relation between Ln UPR and performance varies between subgroups with differing levels 
of CEO power and monitoring. Performance is measured as Adj RNOAt+1. Ln UPR is equal to the natural log of the 
Unexplained Pay Ratio as defined above. In Column (1), High Eindex is equal to 1 if the firm has an Entrenchment 
Index greater than 1, and 0 otherwise. In Column (2), Low InstOwn is equal to 1 if the percent of a firm’s shares held 
by institutional investors is less than the median, and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t statistics 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 11: The impact of employee characteristics on the Ln UPR-performance relation 
Panel A: Employee satisfaction and the Ln UPR-performance relation 
  Adj RNOAt+1 
Variable   (1) (2) 
Ln UPR  0.0066** 0.0005 
  (2.58) (0.71) 
No Fortune  -0.0339  
  (-0.87)  
UPR * No Fortune  -0.0082***  
  (-3.16)  
Low Just fair pay   -0.0024 
   (-0.24) 
UPR * Low Just fair pay  -0.0049*** 
   (-4.46) 
Adj RNOAt  -0.0271 0.2995*** 
  (-1.54) (13.72) 
Ln assets  -0.0707*** 0.0025 
  (-5.32) (0.67) 
BTM  -0.1795*** -0.1322*** 
  (-11.25) (-9.20) 
Leverage  0.0001 0.0010 
  (0.04) (0.35) 
Labor productivity  0.0036* 0.0006 
  (1.69) (0.51) 
Capital intensity  0.0051 0.0029 
  (0.39) (0.25) 
Ln age  0.0179 -0.0050 
  (0.38) (-0.71) 
    
Year fixed effects   Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  No Yes 
Firm fixed effects  Yes No 
Observations  5,082 2,335 
Firms  931 375 
Obs, Fortune = 1  361  
Adj. R2   31.8% 19.0% 
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Panel B: The labor market and the Ln UPR-performance relation 
  Adj RNOAt+1 
Variable   (1) (2) 
Ln UPR  0.0003 0.0013 
  (0.34) (1.06) 
High Turn  0.0159*  
  (1.80)  
UPR * High Turn  -0.0023***  
  (-2.94)  
High Lab Mark   -0.0107 
   (-0.53) 
UPR * High LabMark   -0.0036** 
   (-2.45) 
Adj RNOAt  -0.0317* -0.0517** 
  (-1.77) (-2.07) 
Ln assets  -0.0640*** -0.0374* 
  (-4.68) (-1.87) 
BTM  -0.1793*** -0.1374*** 
  (-10.91) (-6.64) 
Leverage  -0.0003 0.0007 
  (-0.10) (0.17) 
Labor productivity  0.0042* -0.0007 
  (1.71) (-0.28) 
Capital intensity  0.0033 0.0150 
  (0.25) (1.00) 
Ln age  0.0048 -0.0397 
  (0.09) (-0.58) 
    
Year fixed effects   Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects  Yes Yes 
Observations  4,921 2,580 
Number of firms  918 511 
Adj. R2   32.1% 34.1% 
 
Table 11 examines how the relation between Ln UPR and performance varies based on employee characteristics. 
Performance is measured as Adj RNOAt+1. Ln UPR is equal to the natural log of the Unexplained Pay Ratio as 
defined above. Panel A examines how employee satisfaction influences the Ln UPR-performance relation. In 
Column (1), No Fortune is an indicator equal to 1 if a firm was not listed in Fortune’s “100 Best Places to Work” 
list in that year. In Column (2), Low Just fair pay is equal to 1 if the firm-level average of Just fair pay is below the 
median. Panel B examines how the labor market influences the Ln UPR-performance relation. In Column (1), High 
Turn is equal to 1 if Turnover is greater than the median, and 0 otherwise. In Column (2), High LabMark is equal to 
1 if a firm is in an industry where Labor market tightness is greater than the median, and 0 otherwise. All variables 
are defined in the Appendix. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. t statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively. 
